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i . lntroduction
The objective of this report is lo dixuss the need and xopc
for macrocconomic policy coordination in Europe during
lhe various stages towards economic and monetary union.
Scction 2 dixussa the proposals of the I)'elors Committa
and discusses also some alternativc stagcs and roules towards
European inlegration. Attention is paid to the concepts of
convergence, coordination end harmoniration of macro-
economic policies es wcll as to rula and dixretionary out-
coma. Section l is concerned with the necd for coordination
of macroeconomk stabilintion policin undcr alternative
exchange-rate rcgim~, when Europc is hit by shocks thal
uux stagllation. Careful distinction is made betwan Euro-
ptan-wíde and country-specific shocks and atlention is paid
to both monetary and budgetary policies. The advantage of
a monetary union is that bcggar-lhy-neighbour attcmpts to
appreciate the currency are avoided, bw the disadvantage is
that stabilizalion policy is more difTicult to conduct in the
face of country-specific shocks. This is why there may be a
ux for a Europcan Federal Transfer Scheme (EFTS). Sec-
tion 0 is concerned with the public-finance aspects of macro-
economic policy undcr the Europcan Monetary System
(EMS) and with the coordination of macrocconomic pcshcics
in lhe cconomic and monetary union (FMU). Becaux com-
pelilion among Ircasuries and crntral tsanks kads to loo
much xigniorage and too little tas revenues- inflation is too
high. An independent Europcan Central Bank (ECB) leads
to too low ínflation, bu1 the advantages of thc increax in
monetary dixipline are likcly to outweigh thc disadvenlaga
of a sub-optimal government revenue mia Unbridlcd com-
Thb repon has hendrrd from tbe cummrnn r ewad on rn evlmr
ruon ~r r vorYrhoP on 'The economro or xonumrc rnd mnner~ry
umod. n Urawrau.Gnsenl 11 or lhc Commisvon or rAe Fmopon
Communmer in Brmsrls on 12 Norcmlrr 1989 The ~urhor hu slur
prncfred frnm the commrnts of wilh~m Branson, Aka Cukkrrrun,
Mrchul Emenon, Rob de Groor, Akaandrr Itahaner, Frant dc lona.
Pcur Kenen, lrrocn Kremen, Maurir: ObatfcM and Marun .an Tuijl
Tlrc ~whor is p~nrcul~rly ararcful ro Perrr Kensn urd laoen Kmmers
~hn hne tmdly p.rn deurkd vrium commrnu u weU An errnn
rnd om~auons ~re or cnur.r the rtspnnuMlny nf rhe ~unwx
pelition hetween thc Irwsuries o( the EMU kads to an
under-supply of public goods and a downward trend in tas
rates. Sintt Europe'a real eschangc rate and currcnt account
may bc manipulated to brrnst the real incnme of Europe's
ciliuns, it is likely thal budgNary stances will be loo tight.
Section 5 provides Ihree exampks of why coordination of
macrneconomic policies may be counterproductive- it de-
stroys the dixiplinc of the monetary authorities, it may
provoke an adverx responx from the rest of the world, and
it msy fail becaux counlries divgree on how the global
economy works.
The conclusions make a cax for an independent Furopcan
Systtm of C'entral Banks ( ESCB), for a budget-neutral Euro-
pcan Federal Transfer Scheme (EFT~S), and for coordination
of the budgetary policies of the individual treasuries. The
conclusinns alsu argue that thc EMU poses a xrious threat
to Ihc siie of thc puf.lic sector in Furnpe unless the budgelary
policícs of thc various treasuries are ccxxdinated.
2. General issues of macroeconomic policy on
the road to economic and monetary
integration
2.1. 7Ae Proposals of the Ikbn Cnmmlttee for EMU
Tht report prcpared by thc fxlors Committec propoxs
threc transition stages on the road towards full cconomic
and monelary union for Europc. The first stage involves a
cloxr convtrgencc and coordinatinn of the mnnctary poli-
cies o( the various countries taking parl in the EMS.) all
European currencies to join the EMS, liberaliiation of capi-
tal markets throughout Eurnpc, a wider ux of the ecu,
complelion of Ihe internal markets fnr goods and scrvices
by removing physical, tahnical and structural obstacles to
free intra-European trade, a common compelition policy
and other mcans lo strcngthen the markct mechanism, and
a doubling of rcgional and structural Funds. Much progress
has alrcady becn made on thc first stage. The first stage of
lhe Delors proposals for cconomic and monetary union in
Europe has, in principle, bcen acceplcd by the Council of
Mrmsters on 26 and 27 June 19R9 in Madrid. Eight countries
of the European Community must have fully liherali~ed
capital movements by I luly 1990 and the othcr cnunlrics
will follow suit. Spain has rccenlly joincd the FMS and Iht
UK has agreed lo join Ihc [MS as soon as thc capilal
7 For uscful ovcrvir.~ ol rhe lunctíonina o! the EMS, xr Gror and
TbYl~n (19taL (iwnrn rr d (19aa1. and Gnr~rii md (irnvarmim
( 19a9~)
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markets o( Europe are fully liberalized and in0atwn in thc
UK has heen cut to the Europcan average. It xems clear
that the UK first wants to see all obstacles tu free intra-
Europcan trade in financial asxts removed before it gives
up its monetary autonomy and joins Ihe EMS. Hence, the
upshot of Stage 1 as far as macrooconomic policy is cun-
cerned is an enlargemrnt of the EMS, abxnce of capilal
controls throughoul Eurupe and possibly more inlra-Com-
munity trade.
The main uncertainty around Stage 1 is whether the large
public-uctor deficits and debt combined wilh large black
aonomies imply a greater nad for seigniorage revenues
in southern Europe and thus a danger for monctary and
czchange-rate stability within the EMS. The point is thal,
in the past, speculative aUacks on the currcncy have been
(cndcd ofT by capital controls, especially by Italy and Francc,
and by Belgium with a dual ezchange-rate system. Flowever,
once financial markets Ihroughoul Europe are opened up il
will no longer be possible for countries to peg their ezchange
rates and have the freedom to xt their domestic interest
rates. It follows that the high-deficit wuntria of southcrn
Europc may be faced with a deprxiating currency. Thia is
why some advocate a crawling peg betwan the currcncics
of southern and northern Europe (e.g. Dornbuxh ( 1988) ~
However, the uperience of the Netherlands suggests that it
is possible lo have a strong currcncy and high levels of
public-uctor deficits arrd debt when there are no restrictions
on intcrnational capital movements. As long as one is pre-
parcd to give up an independent monetary policy, capital
market hberahzauoq and fizcd ezehange rata need not be
incompatible (Gros (1989p.~ However, one could argue that
Iht Netherlands is in a slronger position lhan, say, Italy
becaux De Nederlandxhe Bank has a much better repu-
talion for an anti-inflationary stance than the Banca d'Italia
and bccauu the Ncthcrlends has a surplus whilst Italy has
a deficit on its current account vis-á-vir Germany.
Although the countnes of the European Communily seem
to be committed to Stage I, thc uncertainty dexribed above
as well as other uncertainties provide reasons why some
countrics do not necessarily wish to go ahead with transition
Stages II and III propuxd by Ihe Uelors Commitlee. Other
(Ther ~ m put furwud m f.vour of . cnwlma pq .rt corwern
.taut the fwurt coheuvcnesf of EMS currencx. when rntern.uonal
tnde m fin.nci.l ..setr n fully libmtixd .nd rhrn thert ir thr danaer
nut the US dou,r may e.ve to f.n br . funha 3LL10'i bcfort alob.l
imbalu.:esmcurrcntkcounu.reehmmared SeeCn.r.n~.ndGwr.n-
m 1196h1 .nd Mebti 1196tb1 for related dncuuwnr
A Ml.nccd uvmiev oI the .rauments for .nd .pmn . ltreskma du.n
or the EMS ar . con.e~uenm of fendma on rpecul.uve .n.ekr bnna
kv ory when uryul nurken .re hberalmed m.y be found m Unlfill
Ilassl
countries (e.g. Denmark and the UK) have some doubl
about Stages II and 111, baauu lhis may involve too much
delegation uf national powers to ut fixal and monetary
policy lo European institutions. The more oplimistic
countries (France, Ilaly and Spain) sam morc enthusiastic
about the EMU, whilst the more rcalistic countries (Ger-
many and the Nelherlands) are willing to go ahead as long
as certain safaguards (such as an independent ESCB) are
built in
The srxond stage proposed by the Delon Committa re-
quires a new Treaty of Rome in order to delcgatc the rc-
sponsibility for monctary policy to a European System of
Central Banks (ESCB) and implies a considerable loaa of
national sovercignty. During the sceond stage the progrcss
of Stage I must be consolidated and reinforced, the EMS-
bands must be narrowr~, and rulea for Ihe siuand financing
of public-sector deficits must be dxided upon at a Com-
munily kveL During the third and final stage intra-European
ezchange rata must be supplemcnted with, and perhaps
evcntually rcplaced by, a single Europesn curcenry, the
ESCB must determine monetary policy for Europe as a
whole and indirxtly the value of the European curcency vis-
d-vis the dollar and the yen, national public-sxtor deficits
must not be financed by printing money and there may
bc limits on government borrowing from abroad, and thc
Council of Ministers (togcther with the Europcan Parlia-
ment) is able to impou constraint on the budgets of national
governments when they would otherwix imply a danger for
monetary stability. The upshot of Staga 11 and 111 of the
proposals uf the Debrs Committee sams to be the establish-
ment of a monetary union with a cenlralixed monetery
policy, a move away from Gcrman hegemony in monetary
policy, and some form of coordinatton of thc fiscal policia
of the various countries of the European Community.
As alrcady mentiorted, it is not ckrr that Europe will want
to go along the route of Stages 11 and 111 proposed by the
Delors Committee Indeed, some argue that unce capital
markets are fully liberaliud it is beuer to move to an EMS
with wider bands for nominal ezchange rates and olhen
argue on the basis of currency substitution that the market
should dtxide whether one EMSturrency will drive out all
thc other EMSzurrcncies. The lattcr is advocated by the
UK, but scems a rathcr fanciful idw. Yct another ida is
that thc chancea of the EMU being a success arc grwtest
when Europc moves directly from Stage 1 to Stage 111
(Cukierman (1989))-
2.2. Tnmition phaxs aod alternatird ia tbe prot~ of
EUroptan IOflgrfflOn
~ It is uuful (or purposes of the following discussion about
coordination of macroxonomic policies lo dislinguisó
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belween various transition phases in lhe prncess of European
integration, and also lo indiute variow alternalive roads
dong which Europe un prooeed. Thia list of tranaition
phasa partially overlsps with the Ihree stages proposed by
the Delors Committa, bw also includcs some altanative
routes The following suga can be distinguisbed (xe
Graph 7.1):
A. Low factor mobility, few inlernational capital move-
ments, manageA eachangc ratcs with German hegcmony,
and uncoordinaled budgetary policies.
B. Low factor mobility, morc ínlra-Community trade (due
to gradual ~moval of barriers to trade), liberalis~tion
of intra-Community trade in financid assets, managed
eachange rata with Cxrman hegemony, enlargcment of
EMS membership, and uncoordinatcd budgetary poli-
cia.
C. (i) Low factor mobility, morc intra-Community trade,
fra international upiul movementa, managcd eachange
rata with Gertnan hegemony, narrowing of EMS-
bands, and coordination of budgetary policia.
(ii) Low factor mobility, more intra-Community Uade,
fra intcrnational upital movemcnts, establishment of
an ESCB without Gennan hegemony whích daides on
joint monetary policy, a further nsrrowing of bands for
intra-Community eachange rata, and coordination of
budgctary policies.
(iii) Low factor mobility, morc intra-Community trade,
free intcrostional capital movemcnts, an FSCB without
German hegcmony and full monelary union, and coordi-
nation of budgetary policics.
(iv) As (iii), but also the establishmcnt of a budget-
neutral EFTS.
D. (i) Low factor mobility, more inlra-Community lrade,
(rtt intcrnational capital movements, establishment of
an ESCB wilhoul Gcrman hegemony which dmdes on
joint monetary policy and ensures a narrowing of bands
for intra-Communily eachange rata.
(ii) Low factor mobility, free intcrnalional capilal movc-
ments, and full monctary union.
(iii) As (ii), but also coordinalion of budgetary policies
and possibly the cstablishment of a budgcl-neutral
EFTS.
E High factor mobility, high proportion of intra-Com-
munity tradc, frn international upital movcmcnts, and
full economic and monetary union.
F. Low faclor mobilíty, more imra-Community Iradc, frtt
international capital movements, widening nf EMS-
bands, crawling peg betwttn wuthern and northcrn
Europe, uncoordinsted budgetary policifs and possihly
s systcm of dwl eachange.ratcs.
G. Low factor mobilily, more intra-Community lrade, frtt
intcrnational upital movcments, floating intra-Com-
munity eachange rales, and uncoordinaled budgeury
policip.
Stage A uptures the situation of the EMS since 1979.
From I luly 1990; most restrictiohs on international upital
movcmcnts must bc abolished, Spain and perhaps the UK
will have joincd the EMS and there will be fewer restrictions
on intra-Community trade in goods and xrvices, so during
1990 Europe mova to Stagc B(the fint suge of the Delon
Committee). In addition, it smns ckar that thc EMS cur-
rently opcrata as a hcgemonic German mark bloc and
that so far thcrc is not much cvidence of coordination and
coopcration inpnctia (see Cohen, Melitz and Oudiz (1988);
Giavazzi and Giovannini (1986b), (I989a); Goodhart
(1989)).s A(tcrwards, various routcs can be followed. t~ne
possibilily is that monetary and budgctary politia arc coor-
dinated at a Europwn level and subsequently this facilitates
the move towuds the EMU, which corresponds to route C
(i) to (iíi) and pouibly C(iv). The route to a more symmetric
eschange-rate arrangement could be via thc (ounding of the
ESCB with all mcmber countria having a righl to vote on the
common policy. An intermcdiate phax may be tn appoínt
represcntatives of EMS countrics on the board of the Bun-
dcsbank (Vaubcl (19g7); Goodhart (1989)), becaux this
would gradually kad to las German hegemony"The prob-
km with this proposal is lhat Ihe new Bundeshank, with íts
co-opted membcrs from the rest of the EMS, may not be
the same Bundabank we know and love so wcll (Kenen
(1987b)). If factor mobility and in particular labour mobility
incruscs, onc could movt to Stage E. However, if factor
mobility is low and uchange rates are irrcvocably fixcd,
lhcn one may wanl to consider Ihc cstablishmeM of a budgel-
neutral inlra-Community transfcr scheme (F.FTS) and move
to Slage C(iv) instead (e g. Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (19g9)).
1 De Gr.u~.e 119R9a1 usn some dYUb on rhelhel ihc FMS can 6c
r.Mncsmud ey cfrman IKafmony Ilo~.ever, dr (ir.uwf ( 19R9.1 .ISo
fnds Ilut luly ( .nd Franoe) manaaed w.nh Ihc cld of upl:l controb lY
.t1I1W1 Wmpt[Ifty IntYtilf IIKIr dOI1KfIK Inlfrffl lilH rrnm t(R'CYt.llvr
.IUCt,
Grus ud l~ne ( 19R9) .uaaesl tMl Ilahlrnina of [MS-MMs lad. lo
rnurt rotfrvcnlian ey .u rnrmeen, even If We tormal reponslMlity !or
kapna csrè.naf r.tn w~Nin Ihc krrdr lin viUl Ihf pcriphcr.l
couMrin. Hfna, poasm on thc propnWr of thr Iklors Commltla
in ibelf k.ds lo . rwe.ksninR or Gemun erytcmcrny
.
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GRAPH 1 I: Phaw le tbe trualtfw ~rocen rowarda ecoaosk as.d aeoeerary letepatba
A eMs
F Widm EMS-b.MC m.4aa pea Wwaw
wataem .ad iwnben Europe: du.l e.~.oae
nta
G Fl.rt: arcakdo.vn o! EM3; Ibuina utn-
Commmity eaclun~ nw; neeonrdre.nd
bud{eurY policia
Lov r.aor mnbibty
An altcrnative way to proaed after Stage B is to gradwlly
move towards full exonomie and monetary union and only
aftcrwards, in the abxnaof high factor mobility, coordinate
budgetary policia and possibly establish an EFTS. This
corresponds to Stages D ( i) to (íii), but when factor mobility
is high one noed not necessarily coordinate budgetary poli-
cies and establish an ÈFTS so thst one proaeds through
Srages D(i) and (ii) to Stage E. Yet another alternative is
to abolish the idea of moving towards full monetary union
and, instcad, to widcn exchange-rale bands and allow for a
crawling peg betwecn soulhern and northern Europe in
order to allow for a grwter need of seigniorage rcvenucs
in southcrn than in northern Europc ( Dornbusch ( 1988);
Canzoneri and Rogers ( 1988)).~ This means a move from
a Fint a.ac o( EMU: IiEmliuooa or opiW mnr~nu nod oompnion or tbe iniernal ourtn (nr
{ood..nd sr.iun
D. (i) to (iil Adv.nmd wF of We EMU: nnr-
ro.inr of EMS-b.M. until ncb.nF ne .n
rrn.nr,wy r.ad: w.bb.b Esca
C. (i) lo (iii) Ad.ynand w{s ar Uc EMU:
bud .ry po4cy ooordin.tion; nurowin{ or
EMS-6.nd. um,l eacb.oae nw ue i,re.mbh
l.ed: nubh.b E4Ca
tn. r.nor mobitity C (iv) FiuMub EF7S
Hi{b (.ctor mobdity ~ E. rdnl EMU
For ~he couninn o( wwhern Eurupc, .namorqe .ppeus w óave
been .n rm{wnant componem o( tlieir f nanaoa poln.ies, whena, fw
counines sucA ., the Neiher).nds ri{nionae is . ne{hpbk wu,a o(
rnun (Giavun (19891, Gnlli 1191ta1) Thia Lck of eomemw m.y
.ell Ee . wnrm o( wnnia m the mo.e to.ud. fiad each.nac nta
.nd ~h., prundc . oa (or . n.bonal money (e a Fi.drcr (19a2))
D. Ini) sydswry enliry ~ran.tinn
.nd pn.dby..,.wob eF-rs
Stagc B diratly to Stage F, Dut it is not clear that this is a
very xnsibk argument. The countries of southern Europe,
such as Italy, tend to have a large public nominai dcbt and
thw it is a big temptation to ux surprix inllation to erode
away the real value of debt. In oquilibrium the private xctor
anticipates thís tcmptation and this results in higher thsn
optimal inllation; the EMS eliminates lhis incfficiency and
may thus be optimal for southcrn Europe even though it
~duces the rcvcnues from xigniorage (Gros (1988)) A final
alternative is of courx to move from Stege B dirxtly to a
rcgirne of Iloating eachange ratu, i.e. Stage G. This disinte-
gration of thc EMS has thc advantage that the intra-Com-
munity eachangc rates un be uxd as an adjustment mechsn-
ism for coping with country-spxific shocks in Europc. When
lhe factor mobility within Europe ~mains low and there is
no coordination o( budgetary policies and no willingness to
have a budget-neutral EFTS, there may be no altcrnative to
Stagc G. This would be a pity, becaux then the well-known
advantages of a grcater common currency arce (saving on
eschange rexrvu, less uchange-rate risk, Irn infortnation
and tranwction costs, etc ) wnnot be reaped
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2.3. Coerergence, coorditutloo and YarmonlzaHos ot
macroecoeomk potkka
Coordination and convergence of macroeconomic policies
within Europe arc stated objectives of the Treaty of Rome.
Thc Council of Ministen made a dttision in 1974 'for
atuinment of a high degra of convcrgence of economic
policies of Member States', which was mwnt to be mainly a
procas of xtting budgetary policy guidelinp (e.g. Slcinherr
(1984)). In the repon of the Dclon CommiUee the concepts
of coordination and wnvergence play a prominent rok as
well.s It is, however, not ckar that convergena of policy
e-loTatically implics intcrnational coordination of policies
(and vice versa); apecially when lherc are country-spccific
shocks hilting Europc. Even when evcrylhing is symmetric
(i.e. common shocks hitting a aymmetric, interdcpendent
system of identical economits), one un converge either on
a nontooperative or on a cooperative outcome! If it is
kft to the market to achieve convergence and powerful
externalitics are a fact of life, one may cnd up in a worx
situation than one started oR with. Hena, convergertce of
xonomic policies does not neassarily sam to be a xnsible
objative on iu own. Obviously, one could argue that the
EMS ought to contribute to a progressive convergence of
economic performance (e.g. a reduction in in(lation differen-
tials) becaux otherwiu there may be a threat to monetary
and ezchange-rate stability but such an argument haa Iitlk
to do with coordination. Coordination refcrs to thc joint
and mutually consistent xtting of the national instruments
of economic policy to maximize joint welfare of the Member
Statcs of the Europwn Community. Converxly, lack of
coordination means that each country xts its own instru-
ments of economic policy without taking into account the
wnxqucnccs on welfare of other countries in Europe 9 Co-
ordination doa not nxeuarily imply convergence of ocon-
omic policíes, especially when individual Member States
are of diRcrcnt siu, have diRcrential social and economic
structures, have dilTercnt prcferences, and~or are hit by dif-
ferent shocks. Convcrgcnce is, however, of~en uxd as an
excux by individual governments to impkment unpopular
policies. In some caxs market forces can kad to convergence
of xonomic outcomes and to the desirability of convergrna
of economic policies. For example, if gross waga arc for
some reason equal to a common marginal productivily of
r
r
Goodhan (19a9) claimr Uut the Delon rtpon uaed ihe word 'coordi-
nation' xt kan ~I timp and the wwd 'conve.acnce' at karl 12 time;
in add~iion, many rynonymr (e.a. coopnation, con crtation) were uand-
SucA n nonuoperxu.e outcomr cortopondr to ths Naah-Cournq
aquiLbnum ourcorne, which in ths preenes of intematiooal ormulilie
ir uu.ally not Pnretosiricxnl for thr wuntrin cw~rncd. Rouhiai
(19r7r,b) nlao conridcn Suckelbera wuwmn, which rruy br rekv~nt
in r discuarion of Gennxn kaderahip in the EMS.
labour in each of the Member States, thcn perfat mobility
of labour throughout Europe implíes [hat it is desirabk for
each individual governmenl lo converge on a commun las
rate on labour incoma Even under thex estreme and un-
realistic circumstances coordination is required tu decide on
which eommon tax rate to converge, Dut in general it is not
clear that convergence of tas policics and budget deficits in
itxlf is dnirabk. In faet, inlernational competition in its
own right tends to drive tas rates down lo a too low level.
International harmonization of economic policies aUempts
to achicve gruter unity in economic structure, to increax
the scope for rulp, and to reduce the scope for discretionary
rolicia. Harmonization is primarily concerncd with long-
term objectiva such as eRciency and distribution (e.g. com-
mercial policy, anti-trust law, labour law, agricultural policy,
regional policy) rether than with the ux of discrelionary
monetary and budgelary policies for purpoxsof macroecon-
omic stabiliution. In short, harmoniiation is chiefty con-
arned with the promotion of frec and non-monopolistic
competition and efTicknt markets throughout Europe. The
completion of the internal European market (1992) is mainly
concerned wilh hatmoníration. Harmonizalion should also
be concerned with the operation of economies; for cxample,
making labour markets more competitive and morc respon-
sive to shocks. If this goal is achieved, this reduces the necd
for the Europwn eoordination of budgetary and monetary
policin.
International cooperation occun, firstly, through the intcr-
national exchange of information, secondly, through inter-
national harmonization of ruks, and thirdly, through intcr-
national coordination of díscretionary policia. Through the
Europesn Community, the OECD, the IMF and summit
meetings there is already a great deal of exchange of infor-
mation. The internal market in 1992 and beyond provides a
considerabk amount of harmoniiation. The Delors report
is partially cotwerned with harmoniretion and design of new
ruks of the game, but importanl questions for the coming
years are whether and how much convergence and coordi-
nation of dixretionary macroeconomic policics at a Com-
munity level is dairabk givcn lhe increasing dcgrcc of econ-
omic and monetary integration of Europe. For e7tample,
whether end whal kind of coordination of budgetary policies
is rcquired under an xonomic and monetary union in
Europe.
2.1. Rules retste dilscreHoa
Two outcoma are often considered for decision-making
in dynamic environmenls. The rules (or pre~ommitmcnt)
outcome is relevant when the monetary end fiscal authorities
have sufficknt discipline or reputation not to succumb to
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lime-inconsistent behaviour, whilst the discrctionary oul-
comc is relevanl when lhe authorilies have no credibility and
thus the private sector anticipata that the authorities will
renege on previously announad policies whenever they have
an incentivc and get a chance to do so (Kydland and Prescott
(1977p.to Examples of a potential time-inconaistency prob-
km occur when workers are temporarily locked into nominal
wage contracts or whcn trwsuríes issue nominal debt, be-
caux then the government has en incentive to engineer a
surprix inflation and thereby erode lhe real wagc and boost
cmploymtnt or wipe oul part of the real debL Not surpris-
ingly, in eyuilibrium one ends up with higher innation in the
discretionary outcome. In most of this report, the discussion
is concerned with the rules outcoma However, when the
cax for an independent ESCB (Sectíon 4.3) or the counter-
producuvity of international policy coordination (Section
51) is discusxd, thc discreuonary outcome is also con-
sidered
3. EuroPean coordination of macroeconomic
policfes during the various phases of
economic and monetary integration:
stabilization aspects
This part considers the role ot stabilization pohcy and the
need for international policy coordination under alternative
exchangeratc regimcs. Sincc the focus is most of the time
on lhe optímal responx Io a situation of atag(lation, i.e.
unemploymenl and rising prices caused by adverx supply
shocks, s standard multipktountry, short-run, Mundell-
Fleming model is uxd for the analysis in this par1.
3.1. European coordfaatioo ot monNary poUciestf
h sttms reasonablc lo assurne lhat therc is nowadays little
mobility of labour withih Europe, perfxt capital mobilityt~
and imperftct subslitution bclween home and foreign goods
io
n
lo Ne tanawae of a.me throry We rub outcwne rnrtnpondr to .
praommilmem uutcomc. rhibt rhe duveuorury oulcnme oorreapood.
to rubpme-perfect outcome.
Tbis secrion dnrr on r.n dn Woq (19aA:; 1990c1.
Snicny rpakina, perfat capinl mobiláy don nor ody reyuin absenoe
of npW conuob but .lao pcrkcr ruMtirutioo Mwern hornc ud
foraan Eoodr. Ahbouah it ream rulistic ro uwmc fua Gbenhnliao
of Europan npul m.rkets. it á.onh rhik to pant ow tM1 there
.rr urn io rhich apul nurkH intear.twn á ony relf~n-rmpro.ina
if aovemmentr ewrdinau their moneury polinn (CLna (19a9)). The
poim á tMt fn.ori.l intcantan cnh.naa thc impact á domntic
policin on fomao iournt nu~, rral .ttantions .nd relbn .nd thw
iberdintion of upital m.rkm mcru.a rhe re1ón bun from nom
coopennve polk-ym.kina
in Europe Three regimes will be consídered: (I) managed
exchange rates (dcvelopment of thc EMS aaording to the
first stage of fhe proposals of the Dclors Committee, Stage
B); (2) monetary union (advanccd stage of the EMU, Stage
C(iii) or D(ii); and ( 3) floating exchange rates (Iloat, Stage
G). The EMS is the status quo !or Europe, which can either
develop into EMU (see Stages A, B, C or D) or there is a
danger that it gradually breaks down into a Ooat (sa Stages
A, 8. F or G). Since the breakdown of Bretton Woods the
exchange-rate regime betwcsn Europe and thc USA was a
noaf, but morc rxently (witness the New York Plaza Sum-
mit in 1985 and subsequently the Tokyo Summit in 1986,
and lhe Louvre Accord and Veniu Summit in 1987), an cra
of coordinated exchange-rate management for the globel
aonomy has gradually rcplaced a clean Iloat (e.g. PPC
(1988); Funabashi (1988); Kcnen (1989)).
It is bnt to start with the nced for intcrnational coordination
under the hypothetical situation lhat Europe is characteriud
by a Iloat. One could think that, when there is full employ-
ment, therc is no rcason for Membcr States to coordinate
their monetary policies. The rwson is that the exchange ratu
adjust to ensure cquilibrium in the balances of payments, so
thst each country can conduct an independent monetary
policy and sct the growth in íts nominal money supply
equal to its real growth ratc plus its desired inflation rate.ty
However, there may well bc a public-finance motivc (van
der Ploeg (1988b)) or a Mundell-Tobin motive (van der
Plocg (1990a))t~ for international policy coordination in a
H.mad, (19~6) .~urrw. PPP (Durclu.iaa porcr p.nty) .nd ura the
rnoneury .ppro.ch to the Mbnu of pymem, fo Jwr thal under fiaed
eaclunae ntaariaul monetary policio .n hiahlY interdependent and
thcrt .n ruona incmuvn ro oourdin,u The rt.wn i. 1Mt there á.
common inlbrion nu, prrn by the reiahted powth in rhe rupply uf
domnrK credit eap.nuon pw aro~vtA in intem.tional rnerva minw
.vsraae arorrh in nal income, .nd . b.brweof-p.ymrnu rurplw
onwn rhrn the deauad for muney eaceedr the domntic wpply ol
money Henoe, .n cap.náoo o( domntic crelit Inda to . defiát,
mirrored Dy wrpluxs elfeohen. .nd . hi{Aer infbtion nu for .n
Memlxr Sutn. When reR~rc depends on infbuoa W the babnce of
p.ymeau, Hanud. (1976) shorr Out, io the .bsenoe of interwriood
policy coordination. in(larion ir hraher tMo derirod inflatioo rhen rhe
increare in intmutiorul rayervn eaomM thc reiahted daired irrcrpse
in rexrvw. Thc rnson á tWt counlrin dcfend them.elva .pioN
rturve wcumuólioa by eap.rdrna domestic creda ud thw nirina
inlbuoo. A flwt don not requin thi. typc of aoordinatios, bewuae
Mbnnn of p.ymrnu .n .M.yr in aquilihrium and e.ch orotnl baak
no M iu orn mwrn.ry pmnh w iu daired iollation nu.
An mereare in bome momary arowth incrnw home infbnoo by thr
f.rne .mouot bur Wvn foreipt iollatioo uruRecrad. It raduar rel
interert ntn .nd upiul .ecumubrion throuahow rhe rorld. Thi. no
lx nikd the interdcperrknt MundM-Tobia eRaet. In tM .E.eon of
interrarion.t policy coopentioa acó muntry faib b intnmlia tlre
benefiaal eRncu of hiaher infbtwn on npul rusvnub[ioe ia tht nru
of rhe rorW .nd thw pwsun too b. . monerary aro.nh nu. ERec-
tirely, nM coumry .nempu to rhi11 the burdm of reduana the rorW
nal inurnt nu to aa compctiron.
t, t
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markettlcaríng worid with Iloating exchange rata. In eny
cax, this view definitcly doa not hold when onc departa
from the fairy-tak world and considen a world plagued by
widespread unemployment. When unemployment is caused
by the downward rigidity of nominal wages, both at home
and abroad, the Mundell-Fleming model u the most appro-
priate framework.ls A monetary ezpansion is a beggar-thy-
neighbour policy, baaux the downward pressure on interat
rates and incipient capiul outfiows inducd a depreciation
of the ezchange nte and thus boosts net ezports at the
czpenx óf foreign output and employment. Ilowevcr, the
monetary expansion raises imports and Ihus consumer pricp
and depre~ssa ral income (defined as the nominal wage
dc0ated by the consumer price indcz) at home and boosu
rul income abroad. It is auumed that wuntries are faoed
with sdverx supply shocks so lhat lhey arc faoed with
sugflation and must be concernod sbout achieving employ-
ment on the one hand and fighting inllalion and mainuining
a satisfactory kvel of rcal income on the other hand.
3.1.1. Stag~)ation carued by common supply shotks
Consider the problem of stagllation cauxd by a Europan-
wide adverx supply shock ( e.g. an oil-price hike). It then
follows that, under thc hypothetical cax of s Iloat and in
the abxna of European policy coordination, uch wuntry
hes a too tight moneury stance kading to too high interest
ratu and cxcasive unemploymenl rstes. The reason is lhat
under a float each central bank attcmpts to ezport in0ation
by appreciating its exehange rate. Coordination rxognizp
that such competítive approciations are futile, avoids beggar-
thy-neighbour atlempta to appreciate the currency and thus
kads to looxr monetary policin and full employment (c.g.
Oudiz and Sachs ( 1981); Canzoneri and Hendenon
( I987)).16
One of the main advantages of a symmetric regime of irrevo-
cably fixed cxchange rates such as the EMU over a Ooat is
that international con0icts about the intrrEuropun ex-
rf Musu (1990) a~~n thar'Tbe behaviour of ral ucMnFe rraa ir rynem-
aUUlly and robauntially inaunwed by the oature of Ihe oomiod n-
chanar nrc repme'. TM poiol ia ltul in lhe move from Bn-noa Wooda
lo Ibauna exclunae rarn. Ihe volalilily or nomiwl eaclunae ntn and
of ral nclunae nrn ao up roarlha. Simi4rly, in muvrna lo rhe EMS,
lhe volahlity o! both real and oomirul inVa-Europon eadunac nln
dimimahed comidcnbly. The mun implralioo of rhu wlid empiriul
fact ir that il is rcawmble ro uwme, al Wn in nc~ rhon nn, lhal
oominal raau and pnrza ue much Ina volauk rlun nomiaal nch~nae
ntn in a naimc or nwtina euhanae rnn. 11 Ihua acenu, u a rirp
Yrot, a aemibk approaironion to aaume ( ard rol uchanR n1a under
thr EMU and volauk rtal eaehanae nra urrdn a noal.
ra Whrn countria inhent a Aiah innauon nre and rnVlpe in a moneury
dwnflarion, one uaway firdr rlut lhir oavn roo fur aa oentral b~nka
alumM ro tiahren 1Mr moncury pohcy ard dump a hiahn col o(
hvin{ on rhnr rivab (e.a. t~di: and Sr.du (19a3); Milkr ard Snhnon
(19rfII
change retea and the distribution of inflation arc avoided.
More precixly, fizing exchange rates under EMU can bc
viewed ss a substitute for international policy coordination.
In f~ct, when the Member Statu are symmetric and are hil
by identical shocks, EMU reproduas exactly the outcome
that prevaib when cemral banka coordinate their monclary
policia under a ckan Iloat or an adjustsbk-peg regíme such
as the EMS. When Member Sutea are not identical, EMU
is only a partial wbstitute for international monetary policy
coordination under a Iloat.
Many vie;w the EMS as an asymmetric exchange-rate system,
bocaux the Bundesbank enjoys monclary hegemony (Giav-
azzi and Giovannini (1986b)). This mcans that in the EMS
the Bundubank xU the money supply and the othcr oentral
banks peg their currencies to thc German mark at s givrn
rala He:na, ona capital markeu arc liberaliud, they give
up control of their money supply. For example, if there is
an Italian balancc-of-paymenu deficit and pressure on the
lira to depraiate, the Banad'Italia must xll foreign re~ervp
and buy up Gra in order [o defend the currency and meet
thc dcmand from importen. Since steriliz~tion (buying of
bonds on the open market by lhe moneury authorities) is
impossibk once capital martets arc fully liberaliud, thc
Italian money supply falls lo thc cztcnt of Italy's balanu-
of-payments deficit. Under such a system, a tightening of
German monelery policy must imply a tightening of Italian
monetary policy, or elx the lira will have to depreciate.
Whcn the Bundesbank nixs interat rates, De Nederland-
schc Bank usually follows suit within a coupk of hours!
Clearly, as long as the Netherlands sticks to a given guilder-
mark rate, it will not be able to conduct an independent
monetary policy. This ia the price one pays for obtaining thc
credibility of the Bundeabank. The macrocconomic trade-
oRs and spill-over eRetU arc very difkrent undcr this asym-
metric characterintion of the EMS than under the more
symmetric arrangemenl of a Ooat or the EMU.Iy
An incrdx in the German money supply lesds to a corre-
aponding incrcax in the money supplia of [he othcr
countria of the EMS and thus to a larger fall in European
interest ratn becaux the non-German central banks are
defertding themxlves against an apprxialing currency. Em-
ployment throughout the EMS increaxs due to the increax
in consumption and investment srising from lower interest
rates, hena a German monetary expansion is now a loco-
motive policy. A devalualion of a non-German currency is
a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, becaux it boosts net ezpons
at the ezpenx of German employmenl and output. The
European money stock increases, so that interest rates fall
throughout the EMS. The non-German cost of living in-
creasn, whilst the German cost of living falls.
rt Fw a rdued uulyfia or dywnic moneu7 polrty Vmn undn Ihc
EMS, an Be{{ and WypMaz (19911 and Ilwxinaa tID1191.
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Rcturning to the prublem of Europcan-wide stagllation
cauxd by an adverx supply shock, abxnce of coordination
of munetary policies in the EMS wilh German hcgcmony
implics thal the non-Gertnan central banks ux a rcal ap-
praiation of thcir exchange ratests to disinllate away Ihc
adverx conxqucnccs of the supply shock so Ihat the Bun-
dcsbank expands its money supply by more lhan Ihe resr of
Europe (Giavaui and Giovannini (19896); van dcr Plocg
(1989c)). The reason is that, when Ihe Bundesbank expands
its moncy supply, the rest of the EMS enjoys an increase in
cmploymcnt and output and Ihus can aRord lo revaluc their
currencies and pay morc attention lo lheir cosl-of-living
targets. Monelary stances Ihroughoul lhc EMS arc tighter
Ihan under EMU Germany achicves full employment, but
expcriences a xvere incrcax in its relative cosl of labour.
The resl of Europe still sulTers from unemployment, Dut
manages to soflcn thc blow to rcal income. Thc uchange-
rate realignmenl allows lhe resl of Europc to reduu the
damage to i1s wclfare at the cxpcnx of Germany. The movc
(rom thc EMS to EMU benefits Gcrmany, worxns Ihc
welfare of thc rest of Europe, but makes Europe as a whole
beuer off. Money supplics increau by more undcr EMU
than under the EMS, so the supply shock has a one-fur-
one tmpact on thc cost of living and kava uncmployment
throughout Europe unalTectcd. Herrce, evcn in a nontooper-
ative EMS consisting of identical counlria hit by identica)
shocks, the exchange rate will be realigncd from time lo
limc, su Ihat tht view that Ihe completion of a common
markel for Europe ('1992' and all that) leads to homo-
gcneous slructures and thus by itxlf creales a lasting moncl-
ary union is fallacious.tv However, if in addilion monelary
policies arc coordinated wilhin the EMS, the movement
lowards EMU will be facilitated. A corollary is that German
leadership uf tht EMS is no substitutc for monctary policy
cooperatiun in Europe.
Finally, considcr lhe breakdown of lhe EMS inro a(non-
coopcrative) Ooal Whcn countries arc conxrvative, i a nre
relatively mure aboul Ihc cost of living than unemployment,
Germany prcfcrs thc EMS to a Iloat. Otherwix, Germany
prefers a Iloat. As far as average European wclfare is con-
cerncd, the EMS is prefcrrcd to a Ooet. The rcason ia, of
couru, that thc EMS avoids fo a artain extcnt the competi-
tive, futile auempts to apprcciate the currcncies and thus
leads to looxr monelary stanccs and Icss uncmploymcnt.
Any wm~4n~wm xnuna from apaa-ulati.r an~cka ~re ~p~ord, .hkb
m.y à r br Incky u wql~l wmroh .ill Ar .Dolnhad from I luly
1990 onrarda
Baae.i ~nd Gu.~ua (19171 uk numcnul umulalan ru alw. IhaL r,lrcn
Ihe EMII wnups of eouatrw wirh diRcrrnt Nrucrurts, il u~ oqim~l
lo havc fiaed inrr~-Euroye~n cacMnae nlo, cven rhro coun~ncr ane
hn by ulemral afwcb
3.1.2. Cuunrry-specific shocks: A case jor an EfTS
The answer lo thc question of which exchange-ralc regime
allows individual governments to Dcst achicvc their nalional
objectives without an cxplicit nad for in[emalional policy
coordination is important and dcpends crucially on both the
origin and thc naturc of thc shocks hitting thc various
counlries of Europc (c.g. Canzonen and Gray (1985);
McKibbin and Sachs (1986; 1988); Kcncn (1987a; 1988); van
dcr Ploeg (t969c))
So far, the non-cooperativc responsn of monetary policics
to a common adverx supply shock under thrce alternative
uchange-rate ~ gimes for Europe havc been considcred. The
main finding has been that for such a shock the EMU (or a
fully coordinatcd floaQ is the pre(erred arrangemcnt for
exchange-ratc management. A second-best exchange-ratc rc-
gime may be the EMS, becaux then at kast the futile, non-
cooperativc attempts to apprxiate the currcncy and cxport
in0ation by tightcning monetary policy that ouur under a
noncooperative Ooat are also to a certain cxtcnl avoided.
However, when there is an aaymmetric dcmand shock, such
as a shift in prefcrcnccs away from, say, UK goods towards
Frcnch gooda, mattcn arc not so simple The initial eRau
of this shock are uncmploymcnt and a trade deficit for the
UK and over-employmcnt and a tradc surplus for Francc.
If labour markets throughout Europe function properly,
then UK wages fall immi~iattly and French wagea increax
to cnsure full employmcnl. If this is the cax, onc should
proceed to EMU and reap all thc bcncGts of a greater
common currency arca (lower lransaction costs, lower in(or-
mation cosls, no cxchange-rate risk, saving on exchange
rcxrves, etcJ (Goodhart ( 1988)). Alternatively, if nominal
wage rigidities prevent labour markets from adjusting im-
mediately to full empluymcnt, thcn worten may migrate
from the UK to France and ratore balance in lhis way. The
Delors Committee puls a lot of emphasis on lhis adjustment
mahanism, but the idca of people in the UK moving across
the Channel to Frarrcc in order to find a job when they do
noI cvcn movc from the north to the south of England
for a job sams a bit unrcalistic. Although intra-European
migration of unskilled labour (especially from Italy to north-
ern Europe) was significant during lhe period 19iSO-74, when
foreign labour was esxntial to the fast-growing economies
of Europe and when governmcnts esublished bureaus to
rxruil migrant workcrs, migration among Mcmber Stalcs
of the European Community hss dxreased since the Trwty
of Rome (especrally Articks 7 and IS) became eRcctivc
(Molle and van Mourik ( 1988)). Forcignen now constitute
only about 2: of the labour force in Europe, so it secros
fair to entertain some doubt about a signifipnt degrec of
intra-Europcan labour mobihty. Unfortunalely, Europe is
11~
Part 111 - Macroeconomic policy and public financc
neither charactcrized by a smooth funclioning of its labour
markets nor by high degrees of labour mobility (due to
diRerences in langwge and culturc)m and thereforc some
form of policy adjustmcnt may bc required. First-bcst poli-
ties should promote morc responsive labour markets and
more labour mobilíty, so that there ceruinly is a rok for
structural policy improving lhe functioning of labour mar-
keu whilc mitigating adjuslment cosu for migrating labou-
rcn.
The most obvious second-best policy adjustmcnt, in the
abxnce of wagc flexibility end labour mobility, is [hen a
looxning of monetary policy in the UK, a tightcning of
moneury policy in France and a depreciation of the pound-
franc rate, for thia boosu net exports of the UK to France
and restores equilibrium. Of course, this is not possibk under
EMU with irrevoobly fixed exchange rales whilsl it is only
poasibk to a limited extent unda the EMS. Alternativcly,
the UK might looxn its budgctary policy and Frana might
tighten its budgetary policy. Howcver, there is a danger that
politicisns will go along with the idea, advanced by the
Delors Committee, that there should be constrainls on too
high budgct deficits, where 'too high' presumably means
that there is a danger that deficita get monctiud and lhw
thal there ia a lhreal lo moneury and exchango-rale stabilily.
Budgetary stancca, oncc correctcd for full employment, are
then likely lo be pro-cyclical under EMU. Thex are the
main reasona why in thc prexnce of asymmctric rcal shocks
a float is lo be prefcrred to EMU or, to a ksxr extent, to
the EMS. The cax for a Owl ia convincing (as Mrs Thatcher
rcpeatedly stema to suggeat) whcn shocks consiat of shifu
in prefcrcnas, but if neverthckss thc traditional advanuges
of e greatcr common currency area arc large enough to
warrsnt the move towards EM U then anothcr form of poliry
adjustment mwt be used.
One possibility is that the cstablishment of EMU must go
hand in hand with the establishment of a European Federal
Transfcr Scheme (EFTS), perhaps not unlike the systcm
envisaged by the MacDougall Rcport of April 1977. The
politiwl merits of an EFTS should be clear, becaux it
cnsures an equitable distribution of the gains and losscs of
EMU,~~ it responds to basic citiunship righu of pcople
:o The reoenl drvrlopmcnu in thc two Cxrm~nyr poride, of wurx, ~
rpxucular rrampk o! I~bour mobibry, wluch mc~nr Uut from thr poim
of rkr of opimum currency vus tM umf~cation of Wn~ prrmany ~nd
Fsu (7cmuny u~ rpkndid idu. It u esunu~l for the EMU to br a
rvmnr th~t labour rw.Eil~ry .ntltin Europe u hiah, rhich nuy be f~irly
prohbk rt the marpn iu wroc ~ectora. Allhouah Molk arW rnn Mourit
(19a8) provdr wmr rmpiriul cvidrncc, morc rork on thu iuue ó
h.ey nxdrd.
Ifo.evrr, ar ~Iw~ys one m~y doubt whnher convoluted political hone-
urdin~ ludr to ~n rquit~bk dutnhm~on. Thc ume rorries apJy to
thr lurmonintion of rukr for wcial ~ecuniy.
living in the EMU, and it fits in with the principlc of
horizontal budgctary equity. It also fits in with the principle
of subsidiarity, becaux the job of arranging such transfers
cannot be kR to individual govcrnments. Thc task of the
EFTS is to makt cxchangt-ratc cfianges unnecessary by
transferring income from one Lountry to another country
when thcre are such shifts in prekrcnces (e.g. Sachs and
Sala-i-Martin (19g9)). In practice, the scheme operata by
transferring income from individwls of one nation to indi-
viduals of another nation and replaces, to a cerlain extenl,
the national unemployment compensation schcmes. One
could envisage a Community-wide tax, which in itxlf would
act as an automatic stabilizn, whose proaeds sre uxd to
finarta a Community-wide unemploymenl compensation
xheme. It ia crucial that such a version of the EFTS is
budget-neutnl. To be more precix tht budget of the EFTS
should be intertemporally balanced ao that taxn arc
smoothed (see Section 4) and that in limc of a boom dcbt,
which was accumulated in time of a racssion, is paid oR.
It is a pity that lhe Delon rcport does not contain any
recommendationa for the establishment of a EFTS, becaux
without it ~gional imbalancea induced by shifts in prefcr-
encea may persisly~ (for example, initial cstimata suggest
that onc third of state-specific shocks in the USA secm to
be cushioned by fedcral transkra).
The reason for lhia reluctana to recommend an EFTS is
lhat there may be strong inccnlíve argumcnts against il,
becaux unemploycd individuals are thtn even kss likcly lo
pack their baga and find a job elxwhere in Europe and
individwl governmenu are kss likcly to pursuc a rigorow
and cRective unemployment policy. In other words, an EFTS
signals to the bargaining proccss thal rwl wages can be kept
hígh, providp an invilation for free riding on European
funds, and givea a fiscal inantive for government failure.
Thex are strong arguments against an EF-ïS to do with
moral hazard and sometimes with advcrse xlection, They
must be taken xriously, but at the samc time it must be
realizsd that they can be rallied againsl nalional unemploy-
mrnt compensation schemcs as well. Most of these incentive
problems can bc overcome by changing the rules of nalional
schemea in such a way that benefiu are only handed out to
the unemployed, if lhe unemployed at the same tíme have
lhe duty to aocept a job even when lhe job ia nol in lheir
field of training (not unlike the Swedish model). If nccessary,
the schemcs un then provide top-up paymrnts to provide
an acceptable standard of living. Obviously, the EFTS
should be subject to similar rulea of the game.
7~ Tbe intrnuon to doubk thc fwWa for rcpond ~nd rtrucmrd pnhcio
dorr, of uwrre, nd de~l rith ~hrar twohkms.
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h must bc pointed out that the EFTS should operale as a
transfer schcmc and thus should not aRcct the overall budgct
of tht European Community,~~ that withoul the EFTS the
budgetary pulicics of the individual lreasuries may be pro-
cyclical, and that it may be possible to design incentive
rulcs that avoid thex problems of moral hazard. The most
obvious incentive rulc is to give conditional transfers. For
example, Iransfers to a depressul region should occur on the
condition that funds are allxated to lraining and xhooling
prograntmcs for the unemployed.~~ In addition, it will be
important to harmoniu the criteria for being eligible lo
benefit from the national unemployment schemes as well as
from the EFTS. Empirical cvidcnce suggesta that country-
spccific shocks are important for Europe, so dapite all iu
problems, establishment of an EF7-S may increax the
chances of moving to irrevocably fixe:d exchange rata in
Europe. If Europe is unwilling Io introduce an EFTS, then
individual countries have a duty to give a much greater role
to supply-side policies in order to ensure lhst national labour
markets clwr and get rid of unemploymenl lhrough the
markct mechanism in a painlcss and expedient manner.
Flowever, when asymmetric shocks corrnpond to adverse
country-specific supply shocks, the case for a(loat and thus
for the EFTS is a bit morc subtle. 7ire reason is that auch a
shock kads both to unemployment and to higher prices and
a lower real income ( stagllation) at home so that on the one
hand a depreciation of the currency is requirod as this leads
to more employment but on the other hand en appreciation
of the currrncy is rcyuired to depress prices and raix real
income. It is therefore nol ckar whether a depraiation or
an appraieuon of the currcncy is desirable from a welfarc
point of view Thís is the famihar dilemma one faces when
one is stuck with stagflauon. In a Ooat the ucess demand
for home goods induces an immediate apprxiation of the
~, wnrn mrrr ,rr ~rmsw,r.rr .nJ Europe-wMe ahuek.. one ,wuld .raut
m,i rhe lwdan o! ihe EFIS snoua Ee b.l,nced in .n mrrnemt~l
run~on .rd rA.i Ihi. rhus Permrn u.nden from one aenentwn lo
norner in ordn ro onret .ucn temponry shork. rlorever. one couM
uaue ~h.r rherc .hould ne limira to rhi. ux or rhe EFFS .nd. m aenenl.
ro ttK rnnsfer of .ddiuonal fi.cal powen w thc fadeni krcl, unoc
be~rs v.ry ~uo much tnrouahoul Europe .rd una rne lanmumrr
shouW Mu kvr u.d u lon{ .r n i. nd rully .ccoumablc ro rnc
ekc~or.res of Europr I.ae .ho (;oodh.n I I9r911
~' 1"hc chalknar n rhua ~o supprnnenr rtdiunlwuve u.ukr nc~mn, w6
s.n FFTS. .nh irr~enuve rvln m ordcr ro makr wrt nut nc~ EFTS
does nd uke ..-uy rhe inunuvr for md~ndud coumnn w.druar ~o
m.rtn .~sn.h a,r ...y or n.rina .nrm m~rnuvr rulr, i. w ev~ld m
condnwn,nry mw ~hc Etls Fw cumpk. rnimna .nd cMwlma
Alurnauvcly. onr cuuld hnr bans ru deqesxJ rcpons wnh cemdiiwml
ekmenn such u mremr rrMrn. rhr rehne sernna u ~hc urrorer An
.liern.nre n. qrhaq. rn uu clunars m VAT rarn ro nnna .bow ~he
rcquued ch.nars m vaacs .nd pnces. hw rhr qobkrn .nrh .uch .
uhemr n ~h.i n runs coumer w ihe .nemp. io harmomre VAT r.~n
m F.uropc
rcal uchangc rate to its ncw long-run value and a cut in the
wedge betwccn consumers' and producers' prices, so that
the fall in ~al income is cushioned compared with the
outcome under the EMU (wilhoW an EFTS) The counter-
part is thal the other countries suffer a grwter fall in real
income. Of course, the falls in employment and output are
accekratexf whílst the other countries enjoy a temporary
increax in employment and output as e result of the apprcci-
stion of the exchange rate Hence, in the face of an adverx
supply shock, the EMU (without an EFTS) copes bcltcr
with unemployment than with real incomc.~s The rwson is
that lhe EMU ksds to an ezpansion of the stcxk of money
balances at homc and a contraction abroad
As far as thc EMS is conarned, an adverx supply shock in
Germany leads to a much sharper fall in German employ-
ment than the fall induad in, say, French cmployment by a
French supply shock. In addition, a German supply deterio-
ration leads to unemployment, in the rest of Europe whilst
ro advcrx supply shock in the rat of Europe kads to over-
employment in Germany. Thc rcason ia that in the first cax
the central banks of the rest of Europe deRnd thcir curren-
cies by buying them up and tightening their monetary policy
whilst in the lattcr ase the central benks of the rest of
Europe prevcnt their currencks from apprxiating by buying
German marka and looxning thcir moneury policy. The
adverx eRects on real irtcome are symmetric, bxaux the
grealer increax in Frcnch waga arising from a French shock
ia cxactly offxt by kss of a fall (actually en incrcax) in
German wages w lhat lhe efkct of a French supply shock
on the real ezchange ratc is uactly lhe apposite of the elTecl
of a Gcrman supply shock.
As far as average European wclfare is concerned, the welfarc
ranking in decreasing order of magnitude is a dooperalive
fioat, a cooperalive EMS, a noncooperative EMS, a non-
coopcrative Ooat and the EMU (without an [FTS). The
EMU (wilhout an EF7~S) perfurms wbadly because appreci-
ation of the ezchange rate can no longer be uxd as an
instrument lo remove the excess demand for home goods.
As a result thc greater expansion of the home money supply
leads to a larger increax in prices, a larger fall in (and
overshooting uf) real income and less unemploymrnt than in
the regimes where lhe ezchange rate is allowed lo appreciate.
Fience, the occurrena of counlry-specific shocks maka the
EMU (without an EF7S) an undesirabk rcgime There is
not much diRcrence bctwecn a cooperative and a non-coop-
erative Ooat In the furmer case tbe home money supply
n TM. n rau.-rlr rhe uppouu of rMr happens under . shdi of qeferenas
from home io fornan aoodr. beouse rhen rhr deproci.non of thr
currcncr rha~ orrurs under . Ilwr wften. rhe adverre rReets on unnn.
pWymrm EW kads ro. funno 6a m rul mumu
las
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cxpands somewhat more, which leads lo somcwhat smallcr
output losses and highcr lossn in real income. Aa far aa the
EMS is concerncd, whcn Germany ia hit by a supply ahock,
it exqnds its money aupply by morc than when lhe resl of
Europe is hit by a supply shock, so that thia kads to smalkr
output bssa and Iarger lossa in rcal income for Germany.
The main conclusion that sticks out, as far aa stabilintion
policy ia concerncd, howcver, ia that EMU (withoul an
EFTS) pcrforma badly when Member Stata arc hit by
country-spocific shocka and performa well when Member
Stata are hit by common shocks.zó One wuld ugue that
lhis provides a wx for the EFTS, unksa budgetary and
structural policid are bolh viabk and achieve the objective
of full cmployment.
3.2. European aroordlnatioa of budgetary polkka~t
Now consider the ux of fixal policy to fight thc ahort-run
probkm of stag()ation caused by a common adverx supply
shock in an interdependent world with nominal wage rigidi-
ties. This is a short-run analysis, so thc dynamica of govern-
ment debt are ignored (see, however, Section 1 for a dir
cuuion of debt dynamics). Undcr the hypothetical ax of a
tloat, a fiscal expansion in one country kads to higher
interat ratcs, an appraiation of ita rul exchange rate, a
boost in real income at homc and a decline abroad, and an
increase in employment al homc and abroad. This ia the
standard two-country Mundell-Fkming story. Treasurin
want full employment, high levels of rcal income and budget-
ary balance. It follows that, in the abxnce of inlernational
cooperalion, right-wing ( left-wing) trcasurics who care rela-
livcly more about the cost of living ( unemployment) have
too loox ( tight) fiscal stanccs and thw end up with excessive
Icvelt of employment ( unemploymcnl) relalive to the cooper-
ative outcome.~~ The reason is that right-wing (Icft-wing)
govcrnments do not internalirt Ihe adverx (heneficial) ef-
fccts of a fiscal upansion on the foreign cost of living (on
foreign unemploymenl) Clearly, international cooperation
leads nght-wing ( Icfl-wing) governmenta to tighten (looxn)
their fiscal stance
~ Of wux, somr rould urue rhar nc~ rul iuue i. rwr nc~ther .hockr
arc wunrry-spacrf or nw hur whrrher ahock. arc sectoral w nor One
coutd mnraar . con,munny-wide .drer.c .hock tn uK .rat md,,.uy.
The mort appropnuc respome u lhcn na nmusanly sunoaonomic
uaMhvtwo polw:y, bul a cowdrnated Communiry utcmpl at resolvina
the probkmr m the arml mdmtry
TAi. ucnon dnw. on van dcr Ploca ( t9t9b).
IX caunx, even Nouah nahr-wina p.emmeot. end up wilh too loo.c
and kll-wrna aovanmewu .nh too ~ah1 fiacal suraa, naM-wina




Under the EMS it is now assumcd that the Bundesbank
ensurea a aubk money supply and the other cenlral banks
of the EMU cnsurc rcletively fixed intra-Europcan nominal
exchange rates. Budgebry policka muat then be uxd to fight
the probkm of stagflation. Since a fiscat cxpansion can no
bnger aRect ral income thrbugh the resl exchange rstc (as
priccs are fixcd in thc short run and nominal cxchange rates
are irrevoably fixed), the EMS avoids competitive, futik
attcmpta to appreciate the exchange rate and may thw be
supcrior to a Bwt. Aa far as spill-over eRcets are conoerned,
a fisul expansion ouuide Germany is s locomotive policy
whilst a German fisal cxpansion is kas eRective and kaa of
a locomotive, pcrhaq even a beggaf-thy-neighbour, policy.
In the former ux the excess demand for non-German goods
is accommodated by an increax in the non-German money
aupply and the exoess dcmand for money in Gcrmany is
choked oR by a rix in European interest rstes, which causa
some crowding out. In the latter cax thc non-German money
supplia fall, as the non-German centrsl banks are selling
Deutxhmarks in order to prevrnt their currcncics from
depraiating, which reduces, and may evrn reverx, the in-
creax in non-Germsn employmcnt! It follows that, in thc
abxnce of coopention, fiswl stanas will he too tightp and
lhst Germany has a tighter fiscal stance than the rest of
Europe. Hencc, the EMS has a built-in deflationary bias for
budgetary slabiliz,tion policip'o and Ihe price one pays for
German hegcmony in monctary policy is thal Germany
cannot be relied upon to be the'Incomotivc rngine of growth'
that pulla Europe out of a recession. Nevuthdess, the EMS
may be superior to a Iloat sincc it avoids competitive at-
templa to apprcciate the currcncy and export inllation. A
typical welfare ranking, from a pure macroaonomic stabiliz-
ation point of view, in decreasing order is: cooperativc EMS,
coopentive Boat, non-cooperative EMS, noncooperative
floa t.
Countries with a large surplus on lhe currrnt aceount and a
modat public debt, such as Gcrmany, should play a grealer
rok in a coordinatcd supply-friendly budgetary expansinn
for Europe (Drèze and Wyplosz (1988)). Supply-fricndly is
important, becausc s number of economisls kar that Europe
may sulTer from a capilal shortage oncc dcmand is cxpandcd.
r Flowcvrr, if a Gcrman fuul capans;on ia a brapr-rhy-neiahhour ry,licy,
ILe (ierman firat auna m.y hc too kwx.
} Drfa rr d(1967). prla and WYplou ( 19ta), and W yplrnx 11990) alao
uaue Ilut Europe ntA iu widnprud uncmpbymrnt prohkm i., in
ncw or iu domnlic pobkma, in dirc nced rr! a coordiruted budacrary
eapaosion, lwt that Ewope ha. od much im.entivc to redurc alobal
imbalanou fa tM .akc of the USA. In otócr cne, too link dcmand
eapaowo u undcnakeo ie Ewope to acr . aood arip at iU prnhkm of
widnprpd uncmpbymrnt.
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flcnce, the prescriptiun is for the govcrnmenl lo invesl in,
say, infrastructure and RáU. The irony is thal Germany
has very little incentive under the EMS to be an 'englne of
growlh' for Europe.)1
Under the EMU with an independent ESCB which punues
a stable Europcan money supply and guarantas irrevocably
fixed intra-European exchange rates, budgelary policies arc
essential in order to stabiliu the rxonomy in the face of
stagllation cauxd by common, adverx supply shocks.~~ A
fiscal expansion in one of lhe countriu raixs interest rales
throughout Europe and crowds out some of the initial gains
in employment due lo lhe fiscal expansion. Employment in
the other countries increaxs when the beneficial eRecb on
net exports outweigh the adverx elTats of crowding out.
This is likely to happcn as the goods markets of Europe
bccome more and more integrated, so lhat therc is a danger
that fiscal stabilization responses will be too wwk relative
to the cooperative outcome. It is easy to show that Germany
then has no incentive to lou the monetary hegemony it
enjoys under the EMS, whilst the rest of Europe is toen to
move lowards EMU.
If wagcs arc fully indexed to consumeri prim (and every-
thing elx is indcxcd), monclary poliry and thus the particu-
lar nominal exchange-ratc regime in force arc irrelevant for
real outcomes. A fiscal expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy, becaux it induces an appreciation of lhe rcal ex-
changc ratc and thus cuts consumeri prícea and wagn a[
home and boosts wages abroad. Hena, abxnce of cooper-
ation in the face of a common adverse supply shock kads
lo excessive budgetary stanas as lreasuries altempt in vain
to export unemployment (Branson and Rotemberg (1980);
Bruno and Sachs (1985); van der Ploeg ( 1988a)).
n TM poinr ir ihal Gcrm~ny currenny hu no rul indindwl inrxonvc ro
enqac in a dcmand npans;on, whcreaa many ofhcr pana of Europe
ould benelir from a Cxrman eapanaion In eny care, micraecondnie
nd aupOtY-aidc proUlema arc muca more imponeol in Cxrmany Mcauae
iheac anik Germanj a aro.~rh of ou~pul. iawrmcnl eM emploYmcnt.
and ralua the reeponr veneas or rAC Gemun aroaom7 ro mcrker rianab
fe a Lipzhi~ n a! (19k9)1
Of courx, one couW araur rlur rhe ESCB raouM adluw ru moneury
policY io ihe faoe of Europnn-wide rhockr bu1 nw may p a~ the
caprnre o! m repuwion for qnct monnary ducipane ( aer Seniun 1)).
Thu u thc rcawn rhy one may advacaie m indrpcndem pnd ihw
pasuvcl ESCB
ri
4. Euro~ean coordination of macroeconomic
polictes during Ihe various phases of
economic and monetar~ integration:
public finance aspects~
This part considcn tbe public finance end allocative aspects
of economic and monetary integration in Europe. The basic
framework that is adopted is one of tax and xigniorage
smoothing (Barro (19~9); Mankiw (I987p, extended lo see
what happens under a float, the EMS (Grilli (1988)) and the
EMU. Individual trwsuries and central banks minimiu the
prexnt value of lhe dcadwnght burdens associated with the
various sourccs of revenues subjecl to thc intertcmporal
governmcnt budget constraint. Attcntion is also paid to the
extcrnaliucs associated with using the foreign debt of Europe
to smooth consumption in individual countries of the EMU.
No particular attention is paid to the ux of stabilization
poliry in the fight against unemploymenl, since the emphasis
is on medium-run issuu of allocation and of public finance.
Unemployment manifesls itxlf in s higher level of dcsired
public spending, bul Ihe role of fiscal policy in reducing
unemploymcnt is not considered hcre. The objative of this
part is to discuss the allocation and public-finance aspects
of international policy coordination; in the past most of
the attention has been focuxd on Ihe stabilizalion rok of
macrocconomic policy.
4.1. Tax and sefgobnge soaothlog under the EMS
One of the most importanl ruka derived in lhe theory of
public finance is that tax ratu should be smoothed ovcr time
and that government debt should bc allowed to incrcax
whencver pubGc spending excceds its permanent level. A
war or temporarily high levcl of uncmployment justifies
government borrowing. However, as long as public invcsl-
mcnt bears a markct rate of return, is does not affect the
permrnent level of lhe public primary deficil and thus the
lreasury is alluwed lo borrow for invptmenl purpoaes. A
balanced current budget and borrowing only for investment
is oflen ~fcrred to as the 'golden ruk' of public finance.
When xigniorage is also a source of publie revenues, in-
(tatíon and nomínal interest rates should go up and down
togelher with tax rates and all of them should be smoothed
over time. In other worda, whcn the rcal interat ralc equals
the pure ratc of time prcference, the theory of public finance
says lhal inflalion and tax rates should follow a random
walk becaux only then the marginal distortions of the vari-
ous ways of raising revenues are equalized. The random-
rr Thir pan drawa on .an der Maq (19911h1 end anempr ro p.e aome
rcawm whr rhe EMU nuy pore r rhru~ ro ihe sia of rM public aanor
m Europe
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walk property implies that the best estimate of tomorrow's
tax ratc, given all the information that is available today,
equals today's tax rate. 11 is in this precix xnx that tax
and in(lation rata are smoothed ovcr time; of courx, shocka
can caux quite a lot of variation in tsx and inllation ratn
over time. The above arguments hold for a closed economy
or for a small open economy with a(loat, but not necessarily
for the EMS. Under the EMS, countrics other than Gcrmany
peg thcir cxchange rate to the German mark and give up an
independent monetary policy in order to obtain low inflation
through the strong disciplinc of the Bundabank (e.g. Gia-
vazzi snd Pagano (1988)), but this meana that they can
extract less xigniorage and end up with a sub-optimal
government revenue mix and a too low kvel of public
spending. Of courx, this argument should not just be viewed
in this narrow public-finance perspective. Generally spcak-
ing, benefits accrue from higher inflation (e.g. it may be
easier to keep real wages down) and thus in a broader
perspective they end up worx off. In order to Ilesh out the
above argumrnts, it ís worthwhile to construct a simpk
model.
The government's intcrtemporal budget constraint can be
written as
dt PV(g) - PV(r f pm)
where d, g and m denole, rapcctively, lhe levels of public
debt, exhauslive public spending and real money halanas
(all expressed as fractions of the national income), r denotes
the dircct tax rate, p dcnota the rate of in0ation (or the
growth in the nominal supply of high-powered money), and
PVfgJ denotes the prexnl value of the stream of fulure
levels of g cakulated with the aid of the real interesl rete
corrated for real growth in the national income, say r, which
is (as capital markets are fully liberaliud) determined on the
world market. In plain words, solvency of lhe govcrnmentb
finanas requires that lhe current public debl plus the prexnl
value of future kvels of exhaustive public spending must
match the present value of the strqm of future tax and
xigniorage revenua. The abxna of capital market imper-
feclions mcans that public debl can be uxd as a smoothing
device. The govcrnmcnt does this by choosing tax rates,
monetary growth rates and public spending levels by solving:
mínimize PV (h l r~ t b?p~ t by(g -~)1t bs(p - p' )zj
where ~and p' denotc lhe dcsircd Icvel of exhaustive public
spending and the German in(lation rate, respativdy flence.
the governmenl minimaes the excess burden cauxd hy tax-
ation and inllation,~ attempts to mainlain a dcsired level of
spending, and at the same time auempts to achieve an
inlermediste larget by stahilizing the nominal valuc of its
currency vis-d-vis Ihe German mark in order to converge
lo the German inllalion rate. Germany has independcnl
monetary policy (b~z0), but for the othcr EMS counlries,
b~ indicates the weight they sltach to the EMS anchor.~s
For the Netherlands, b~ is vcry large, but for the UK b~ is
small. The optimality of the gnvcrnmcnt revenue mix is
measured by the firsl three terms, whilst the fourth term
measura an inlermediale largel associated with monetary
discipline (stt Section 4.3.1).
Thc first-order conditions show that r must follow a random
walk end that two optimality relationships must be satisficd
p~(Atmr f 6Jr')I(hz f hs) and blt - by(1t" - R)
Ilence, the marginal cost of direct taxes and of ín0alion (pcr
unit of real money balances) musl equal lhe marginal henefit
of cxhaustive public spending. For Germany and to a Icsscr
extcnt the UK, b~ is negligible and conxqucntly inllation
and tax rates go up and down together, but for the F.MS
followers, b~ is substantial and consequently their inllation
rates arc licd Io the German rate which Itads to a sub-
optimal government revenue mix (more precixly, the com-
bincd costs associated with bl, h2 and b~ gn up whcn A~
increaxs). Exhsustive public spending goa up whenever
taxa go down, and vice versa, becaux the first-order con-
ditions demand that whenever the marginal distortions as-
sociated with taxation diminish, the marginal bencfits associ-
ated with exhaustivc public spcnding must diminish as well.
Upon substitulion into the governmrnt's intertemporal
budget constrainl, one obtains ( afler a suitable normaliza-
tion)
r o(bz t bs) (rd t g~ - bc m ~o
wherc the permancnt level of desired exhauslive public
spending is defined as gp :- rPV(g~ and p'r, :- rPV(p').
The government's inllatlon-correcled deficit (change in d)
then follows as
rd ~ R - r - pm ~(Jt~ -~ - IhsJ(h7 f hsll m (p' - pp)
L The mrnu uxu of ~nticipnted inlLrion cin urwlly be meuured in termr
of rn~naler under rhe money dem~nd reheduk 1lowever. empnc~lly
the maamiude o! fuch cwlr art un~ll rnd in ~ny use unda the awnnty
róeory thnc casu ~re rrro. Howcver, it r hiahcr kvel of ~nricipied
inMlion k~da lo a Aiaher v~n~nce o( uruntinp~rcd inn~iinn, rewurm
.nll br miadlors,red, ubitrary redutribution ruu4d amur ~nd, perhepa.
kw bna-term wmrncu will bc made. The rewhina cons or innnwn
may Ec rubuond
rr Emt,riut rviacnQ m.y er rr,nnd in er rnns .ne .,n drr ~IrKs t tvwll
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A permanent mcreax m thc deSlred ICVeI of cxhausuvc
public spending rcquires highcr tax and seigniorage revenues,
bw a lcmpurary increase is fully met and Gnanccd by bor-
rowing An anuctpalcd increax in thc JcsueJ level of
exhaustrve public spcnding leads to an increax in laxts, a cul
in spcndmg tuday and pubhc saving. A pcrmancm increax in
German intlation Itads to more xigniorage and thus allows
a cut in taxes and an incrcase in cxhaustive pubhc spending.
but a temporary increax in German inllation leavcs the tax
rates and levcl of cxhausUve public spending unaffected,
leads to a biggcr incrcax in in0atiun and xignioragc rev-
enues, and thus allows wme public debt to be paid olT.
l~he gencral poinl is thal, when there is a need to raix
rcvcnues fur the public sector, therc is a trade-uIT between
zero tax distorlions and uru inllation kading tu buth a
posiuve tax rale and a pusttive inflation rate (Phelps (197J)).
{{uwcver, a strung commitmcnt to the intermedíute targct
of defending the currency within EMS-bands (high value of
b~) induces a sub-optimal public rcvenuc mix, i.e. tuo htgh
taxes and too luw inllation (as measured by lhc terms in 61
and bj), and a tuu low kvcl of exhaustive pubhc spending
(as measurcd by the lerm in b~) In this senx, lhc price one
pays fur juinmg the EMS is a luo small sizc of the public
xctor ~d
Perhaps n is wunhwMle to dtxuss al thrs juncture why some
ecunomists think that thcre arc important public-Gnance
rcasuns agamst muving frum Ihc EMS wilh managed ex-
change rales lo the EMII wrlh irrevsxably fixed uchange
rulcs ( Durnbuxh ( 19gg), Cantonen and Rogen ( 19gg))
Thcir puint is that the countries uf southern Europe. Italy,
Spain, Purtugal and Grcccc, bavc ~lativcly a much greater
nccd fur xigniorage revanucs than Ihe cuunuics uf northcrn
Europc anJ lhal a fixed exchangc ratc deprivcs tht cuuntncs
of southcrn Europe of a potemially importum source of
puhlic revenucs-xignioragc Thc reasun is thal thc cuuntrics
of southern Europc have much hrgher cusu of tax wllecliun
and a larger black ecunomy t proxied by a relauvely high
value uf ht), su that Ihe optimal ruks for public finance then
Immediately give nse rrreris puribus lo hrgher in0ation ratcs
and luwrr dlrecl tax ratcs ( xrt abuvel. The firsl-bcst pulicy
is, of courx, to get rid of the black economy, reduce thc
costs uf lax cullaaion and thus enable onexlf to cut the
b tn ,nY c,.e. s,rme .r`uc un emrrrw,l rruurd. IIu1 Ihe FMS has nur
n,nY r„1 .,~n . r.nn.rK ~nn,n.M ,.n.,nrMy~nr u.dr-nn Ir r.r
sure.f bY sa.nf rsuns) .nywaY
Itbrnbusch II9t911 'n~e rea,.,n
may he Inal EMS coumnn employcd . ar,du,hst dn~nllaoon
pola-Y
vh~lsl somc of rheu oompnnnn (ihe UK and rAr I1SA)
emryluYcd ,
rhock ne,lmrm io an rid or ~nn.unn Ide er.u.a 1
wa9bn llnre.cr.
ahen uóue Ih.r rherr n evHrence ~ha~ Ihe EMS
has rnabkJ counines
such as trel.nd io reduce Ihe ou~pul ausn á
dnmltaiwn IKremcn
(19RY11
inllauun rate Onc cuuld -argue that a second-bcst pohcy ts
lo have a crawlmg peg bctween the currencies of northcrn
and southern [urupe as Ihis wouW accommodatc the re-
yuircd dilTerenual in intlaUOn rates Although this xems to
provide a convinang publtc-financc case against narrowing
EMS-bands and moving to the EMU, Scction 4.3 will argue
that the argumcnt may nol hold water.
4.2. Competitioo ~mong lhc cenlyd Danks and treasuries
of a monetary union
The prcvious section discusxd lhe public-financc tmpli-
calions of the EMS while lhe remaining xctions focus on
the EMU. This xctiun pays aucntion to a monetary union
with a dcptndent syslem of central banks, whilst Secuon 4 3
prcxnts the cax for an independent ECB Secuon 4.4 as-
sumcs the extstencc of an indcpcndcm ECB, whox suk task
il is lo maintain price slability throughoul Europe. and
conccntralcs anentiun on the xope fur indepcndent budgel-
ary policies tu be conductcd by thc mdividual trcesurics In
particular, threc externalities are idcmi~ed m Sectiun 4.4
which all go in thc dircctiun of a too low level of exheusuvc
public spending liefurc this can bc donc, it is however
worthwhile to xe the prublems that uccur when a monetary
uniun docs not have an independcnt system of central banks.
Consider a monetary union of N countries, dcnoted by thc
subxript i z 1. ..., N. whou system of central banks is run
by the vanous treasuries and ts thus nol independent. There
is a common in(lation rate, p. and cxchange rates witMn thc
union are irrevocably fixcd. 'fhe governmcnt of country i
solves
minimize PV~btri i b~z t 6Y(g, - li;)2~ s.1. Jr t PV(g~) ~
PV(r, t f,)
where s, is lhc amount of sagniuragc takcn by ucasury i
from the cummon central bank. Individual governments arc,
in contrast tu the rather odd recummcndatiun of lhe Deloa
Committtt fur gmdclines on public-sectur deficits, frtt to
burrow as long as they remain solvent. It also needs lo tate
account of the budgel constraint of lhe dependcnt syslem of
antral banks~. al t st t... f sN - pnrN Thc mein
calernahty is, o( cuurx, lhat the seigniorage each treasury
grabs from the system of ccntral banks leads to highcr
inllauon for all the other countrics of the monctary union
as well.
In lhe non-couperative outcotrx ( denuted by a superxnpt
M
blrN s 6711~ - gN) a(birrrNlpN, r ~ I..... N
must hoW and tex ratcs and lhus inllauon rates musl follow
a random walk As befure, inllation and tax rates go up and
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down togethcr and move in thc opposite direction tn lhe
level of exhaustive puhlic spending. In addition, sina there
is a common in0ation rate and the costs of tax colkction
and thc parameters in the welfare-loss are assumcd to be the
same across countrics, tax ratn must be the same in all
countries of the EMU as well, cven though kvcls of desired
public spcnding and public debt may vary from country to
country! (Of courx, when the cost of colkcting taxa is
much highcr in one country than in lhe rest of the EMU,
its optimal tax rate will be lower than in the rest of the
EMU.) In the coopcrative outcome (denoted by a superscript
t7 the trcasuria internalire thc adverx external eRects from
grabbing morc xignioragc so that
bll~ L hif~ - Rc) a(brlml rr, t a I. ..., N
must hold: the marginal distortion from collecting xignior-
age revenua is N times aa large as under the noncoopentive
outcome. The cax of an independenl system of central banks
(dcnotcd by a supcrscript n is rckvant whcn monetary policy
is xt so as to maintain pricc stability throughout the ~gion
and thus corresponds to uro in0ation, pr~0, whilst the
fiscal suthoritia havc no oplion but to acccpt this and givcn
this find it optimal to let taxes follow a random walk.
Upon substitution into thc treasurics' intertemporal budget
constraints, one can show that
pN ~(.dfy~~(rn ~( blmMl exceeds p~- (rd t~~[m 4(bI
m)] exaeds p~ ~ 0
wherc b - hs(b ~ 1 t b j~), d denotes lhe average of the dl,
and g; denoles the average of Ihe gfy. Conllict between the
treasuna of a monetary union wnhout an independent
common central bank leads each of them to grab too much
xignioragc, which pushes up inllation for the whole region.yy
Inlernational coordination of monelary and budgelary poli-
cies leads to lower monetary growth and inflation, higher
tax rates and lower levels of exhaustive public spending for
each of the countries of the union, becaux the seigniorage-
in0ation externalities are now internaliaed. An independent
system of central banks musl be governed by ullratonxrva-
tive antral bankers and thus achicves a stable price kvel, so
that the treasuries must make up for lhis loss in xigníorage
revenucs by resorting to highcr tax rates and lower kvels of
exhauslive public spending than would be the case under a
cooperative dependem system of ecntral banks. It is easy lo
show Ihat thc highest welfare is achieved when the various
ministers for finance coordinate their budgelary and monet-
ary policies in a dependent system of central banks, whílst
the lowest welfare is achicved under an independent system
of central banks.
t~ In facl, Ihe moneury union may end up u Ihc wrona ude of the
.eianiouae l~Rcr curre, rhen demand deprnds neaatively oe eapeaed
inMGon (Airenman ( I~U
~.3. The case for ae Independent ESCB: Ruks versus
dfscrctbrt
If an independent ESCB Iwds to a sub-optimal govcrnment
revenue mis and a dectine in Public spending and conx-
quenlly performs so badly compared with a nnntooperative,
dependrnt ESCB and a jorriori with a cooperative, depen-
dem ESCB, why then doa the Dclors Committce strongly
advocate an independem ESCB baxd on the German (and
Dutch) model?u
The answer must, of courx, be that one is afraid thal a
dcpendent ESCB is likcly to sucèumb to pressurc frnm
individual minislers for finance to finance their levels of
public spending. An indepcndent ESCB is by many believed
to be the only viable mcans of ensuring a strong and undc-
niabk monetary discipline. More precixly, an independent
ESCB, whox primary task it is to prexrvc price stability,
is not going to either levy a surprix in0ation tax in order
to wipc out the real valtx of outstanding nominal public
debt, or Io incrwx the money supply in order to accommo-
datc the demand from ministers for finance for more public
spcnding or to accommodate the demand from unions for
higher wages.yv Since ministcrs for finance, unions and other
agents anticipale that an independrnt ESCB is not going to
give in to Iheir demands, they xttk for kss and ax a result
in(lation in equilibrium is lower than it would he undcr a
dependent ESCB without much monetary discipline. This is
the main reason why cenlral bankers-the main signatorics
of the report produced by the Iklors Commitlee - are very
much in favour of an independent ESCB~ they dislike in-
Ilation more than anything clx and an autunnmous body
for sctling monetary policy is the best way to achievc a
stable price level!
In view of the abnve dixussion, it musl he clcar thal il
is much more rclevant to compare non-conperativa and
cooperative discretionary outcomes under a dependent
y Io fact, the Delwx Cumminee recommrnds a kdnal srruciure m whKh
thc ceotral A.nkr nr thr EMU countne arc ~nwrporated in an I:SCB.
The ESCB ahouW luve an auronumous and indepernkni rutus lhe
FSCB ahould have Ihrce kveh of oraamuiu.n 1~) ~he founcd u( the
ESCa conaiwna of Ne preudenta uf ~he ~unonal anlral banka, wh~ch
ir udepcndent o! Ihe Commumiy arW nanonal authorinea ( see Ihe
German ~ZenualbankrN~1: fi) thc Itoard of Ihc eSf9. wnicb monnors
moneury devebpoenu and ovwam the impkmenution of ~he cnm-
mon morKU7 poliry (rer tbe Gernun '[hrctinrium"1; and liu) Ihe
rulional aeolral b.ntr whicA raecute Ihe deciaionr uken by Ihe C'ourkil
(amthe'Landea:entratb.nkrn'IldsoaecEijtfnaer11989t1 Manymure
deuib on Ihe FSC wn bc round in rk Cmv and l:iov.nnmi 119a91
IX cnur.e, the bnt-beu responr ia ln deruor ruch ~n~nnvn ~n rene~r
on mrminal contracu throuah. fur eaampk, waae irWeaanon or thc
iasue of indeaod ratber tlun numinal bonds Conversely, an independenl
FSCB doe nd destroy all forms of cap~ul kvy
w
iso
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ESCB with lhe rulcs outcome under an indcpendent ESCB.
In other words, to asxs the case for an indcpendent ESCB,
one should trade oIT the disadvantage o( e sub-optimal
government ~venuc mix and a lower levcl of cxhaustive
public spcndmg ageinst lhe advanlage of a better munetary
disciphne end the lowcr inllatiun this brings with n
It is posvble lo think of at kast three polenlial sources of
time incunsistency that may be rckvant for an ESCB. The
first is when workers are lockcd into nominal wage contracls
and the central bank rencges by eroding the ~al value of
the wagc and thus boosling Ihc level of cmploymcnl (Barro
and Gordon (1983), Giavazzi and Pagano (1988)). In so
(ar as Europc cnjoys wagc indcaation, this source of ume
inconsistency is less rclevant. The second occurs when the
demand for money depends negatively on the expected in-
flation rale, becaux then Ihe central bank has an incentive
lo renege and levy a surpnu inllation lax and ux Ihe
xignioragc to cut distortionary taxts and boost welfrre
(Calvo (1978), Barru (198J), van der Plueg (19g8b), Cukier-
man (1989p. The third oaurs when treasunes issue nummal
rathcr than rwl or indexcd govcrnmem bonds, becaux then
Ihcre is in principle an incentive to impox a surprix inllatiun
tax, wipe out the real value of government dcbt, and have
more funds available to cul disWrtionary taxes (Gros (19g8))
and increax tht level of exhaustive public spendmg. In all
thrtt caxs the rules ourcome kads, in equilibrium, to lower
in0auon than the dixretionary oulcome, hence dl three
cexs can be used to illustrate lhe advantages of an indepen-
dent ESCB. To illustrate the argument, howevcr, attention
will be fucuxd on tbe monetary dixipline Ihat an indepen-
dent ESCB may oRer in safeguarding rhe rcal value of
pubhc debt, probably the most important source of ume
inconsistcncy for Europe.b
Hence, auume that the treasuna issue, instead of real (or
indexedl bunds, nominal bcrnds wnh a guaranleed numinal
rate of return, r t pr whcre g` denotes the rxptcted rale of
inflation The expectcd or rr onre ~al interest nte, or just
the real intcrest rate fur short, is atxording to this Fishcrian
relationshlp determined by consumption lastes and pro-
duction lechnologies, more ur Iess independcm of the ex-
pccted in(lalion rate, p'. If you compare any two States with
p iTerr i. pkmy ur e.derwe rhar r.~ca m Ewupe .re r.irly weu rMe.a1
w wnsumerr' p~wna (c a aranwn .nJ Kolemheq 119f011, w Ihn Ihe
rcupe for erudma rhe re.l ralue uf Ihe waae rhrouah unanrn:rp.led
mnanun u hmrud In any cau, ir u srrai`hrtorward ra rarcnd nc~
uaumenu of nus pan ro .Ixr dluw for an eReer ol unanrw-rp.red
mllarion on uwpur .r m Wrro .nd Gordon (19a)1 Srrr~ money u
.mlr hew ror n.n.acnonr r.rher rn.n rur rpocalan.e purpumr. nc~re
n nor much .rupe !or erodina nc~ real v.lue of money bal.ncer urher
In .ny cax. pubhc deW rn Eurupe n much I.racr Ihan rhr uoct ,r( re.l
nwncY Mlanur
identical tastes and lechnologies, any dlRercnce m numinal
interest ratcs must then he due to diRrrences in upected
in0ation ratrs The rcahzed or r. posr real intcrest rate,
r t p'- p, is relevant for borrowrng and lending acuviUCS. It
decreaxs wilh unanticipaled in0alwn, which is unc way in
which governments can reducc the Icvel uf thar inllalion-
corrc~cted defidt (. t p' - p) Jr t gr -- r~ - prn, ancl reducc thcir
debt-GDP ratio ovrr umt.~l Thr problem uf lime mconsisl-
ency arises becaux unamicipated in0ation can be used to
wipe out the real value uf public debt Two outcumes should
bc cunsidered: rules and dlxretion l~he puint abuul the
trade-ofT twawcen an opumal government revenue mix un
the one hand and dixiplinc and luw in(laliun on the olher
hand cen bc madc both for the EMS and the EMU.
1.3 1. Thr role uJ rhe Bundesbunk in rhr Eb1S
For slmpbdty, consider first the EMS and the role of thc
Bundesbank Assume thal lhe guvernmrnl mimmizcs thc
same welfare luss function as in SecUUn 4.1. The rules out-
come is appropnale when lhe government has sufTicienl
dixipline not to renege. The governmrnt can then credibly
in0uence expeclatiuns of Ihe private sector so that in the
determinalion of its opumal policy it can assume that
p'~p. The rules outcomc (dcnotcd Dy a suprrscnpt R) is
obxrvationelly eyuivalent w a siluuuon where thc govern-
ment issues real or indexed bonds. Of courx, the rulcs
outcome must be enforced or elx the guvernment has an
incentive to cheat with an unanticipated inereax in mondary
growth and a corresponding ~duclion in dislortionary taxes
and increax in the kvel of exhausrive public spending.
The dixretionary oulcomt (denored by a superxripl D) is
appropriate when the governmem cannot make crcdible
announcemcnts anJ conxyuently must take p' as given in
the determination of iu optimal policres. The firsi optimahty
relaUOnship of Section 4.1 changes to po ~
(bl(m t r~ro t btp')1(bi t b~), so that fur a given ux rate,
exhaustive public spending is as before but mflation is now
higher than undcr the rules outcome, at kasl when the
government has issued numinal debt. The reason is thel a
lowcr monetary growth would not be crcdible, becaux then
the governmem is temptcd to levy a surprix inllation tax.
Upun subsliluuon into the governmrnt's intertemporal
budgct comtramt, onc has
ro L rKl l t bl(m t(b2f b~)~(brm)a Iess than rR
Srnu the real srrnt uf publrc drb. J n no lunaer . pralerermnxd
r.n.ble. an rrrreau m rhr kvel nrher rÁan rn rhe pnwrh of Ihe nwninal
rupply of hiah-powrrM nwney kads ro an ertu.l mnnx in rhr pna
k~cl .nd can rhur be uud ro wpe oul rhe ~al v.lue of puhlK deM .1
'rhe .trn1e ur a prn" Lee Keynn 11Y711. rTapur 21 Sueh capml knes
.re nor d~xu.ud here
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It follows immediatcly Ihat gn excceds g~ and it is slraight-
forward to show that po exceeds pR. Hcna, a lack of
monetary disciplinc, cspecially fnr countria with a high Icvel
of public debt, leads to lower taa rates, higher innation ntn
end higher levcls of eshaustive public spending Ihan would
bc the cax when central banks do cnjoy a repulation for
sticking to rulcs. One can argue that this is a rcason why
countries of southern Europe with a dependcnt antral Mnk,
a lack of monctary discipline and high kvels of public dcbt
eauact relatively more revcnucs from scigniorage Ihan from
dircct taxation. Another rcason is that thc costs of tas
collection and the siu of the hlack economy are grcatcr or
lhat the taz systcm of those countries is less efTicienl (higher
value of ht), so that it is optimal lo have higher inllation
and lower tax rates, cven whcn thc ttntral hanks of lhex
countries have a rcputation for not suceumbing to preuures
of in0atinnary finana.
The main rcason for the cenlral banks of southern Europe
tn join the EMS may be that they gain thc credibility of the
Bundesbank and thc associated tying of their hands (prosicd
by b~) leading to lowcr inllation (associated with the Icrm
in h2) which they would miss othcrwise. Thcy havc lo judge
whether this advantage oulweighs thc las clTicicnt public
revenue mis they may he stuck with undcr the EMS (associ-
ated with the terms in At and by). 1he choia is to have either
an independent monctary policy and no repulation (6~~0)
or to pcg one's in0ation ratc to thc German ratc and obtain
the credibility of the Bundesbank (b~ tends to infinity).
Ncnce, to have an inccntivc to join the EMS, the welfare (as
mcasured by thc tcrms in bt, bz and b~ only, thus cscluding
thc intermedíate larget hJ undcr a rules outcome with fiaed
cachange ralea and no indcpendent monctary policy (very
high value of b~, denotcd by the superscript ~ should
be higher lhan under lhe dixrelionary outcome with an
indcpendent monetary policy and Boating cachange rales
(b~-0, denoted by the superxript Fl. Since pE is kss than
pF but rF cxceeds rf and gF is kss than g~, orx has to tradc
oIT the merits of lowcr inllation against thc costs of bigher
tas rates and lower kvels o(cshaustivc public spending. One
can show that, for the cax of g a~, it pays to join the
EMS whrn (b~-brntWcacttds (i,j r btmyyrr, irrespcctivc of
the value of 6~. Henu, countries with a very high priority
for low inllation (high value of bi), with a low priority for
chminating tas distorlions (low value of ht) and with a Iarge
outstanding stock of nominal government debr (high valuc
of rn have a suong incentivc lo kvy an unanticipaled in-
flatinn tax and tbus will wam to join lhe F.MS in order to
bind their hands to thc Bundesbank. For thex countries,
lhe gams im m~nctary discipline outweigh Ihe lossu from
more tax drstorsions. Italy, Ireland, Bclgium, and the Ne-
therlands have high levds of public debt and, espceially
the latter two countries, have no clear wish to reduce tax
distortions: no wonder that Ihey are such fervent supporters
of lhe EMS! Thc UK is vtry kcen on rcducing taa distortions
snd has kss of s public dcbt prohlcm, which may hc a reason
why it is kss keen to join the F.MS.
Rccent dcvelopments in Eastern [urope may well he rekvant
for the dcvelopment of the EMS as a zone of monelary
discipline. Thc unificalion of the two Germanys crealrs
additíonal dcmand for West Gcrman products from East
German citiuru to consumc whal thcy previously could
not and from firms to build a new infrastructurc for East
Germany. Thia is why many fear a hout of inllalion in
West Germany during the process of integrating Ihe two
economip. This may wcll lhreaten the role of the Bundes-
bank in the shorl run as a nominal anchor for the EMS,
since inflation in the whole of Europe may thcn rix. If this
occurx, it is less likely that countrics will wam to join or stay
in the EMS for then thcy have to give up an indcpendent
monctary stabilintion policy (see Section 3) without neccss-
arily obtaining a lower in0ation rate, cven thnugh thcir
public rcvenue mix may become more efTicient.'~
1.3.I. The role njan indeprndenr ESCB in EMU
There seems to be a xrious political probkm in moving
from thc EMS Io EMU In order for the UK, Prench and
Italians to benefit from the enhanccd monetary dixipline
oRered by the 8undesbank, they necd to kavc it largely
untouched as an autonomous institulion. Indud, the ESCB
advocatcd by the Delors Commiuec is mcant to he indcpcn-
denl and bascd on lhc Bundcsbank mndel. However, from
a political point of vkw Ihe indeprndence and autonomy of
such an ESCB may he lhrcalened- bccaux in lieu of the loss
of an indepcndenl moncury policy the electorates of thcx
countnd src likely to waM a strong ckment of conlrol in
the ESCB. But this is likc throwing lhe bahy out with
the bath water, baaux it would dcstroy thc disriplinary
advantages associated wilh creating Ihe new inslitulion in
lhe first place. Dcspite the danger of thex polilical prohlems,
it seems wurthwhik to compare thc nontonperativc and the
cooperative discrctionary outcomes for thc EMU, when it
works whh a dependent ESCB (denoted hy the superxripts
Nn and CI), respcctively) on the ~ne hand, with the rules
outcome for thc EMU whcn it works with an independeN
ESCB on thc other hand (Aenoted by Ihe superxript l, as
discrosed in Section 4 2).
'~ (N coune e.nc wuld quesu.m rhy a achanaerate ~aqc~ u ure
aed~blr tMn ~ direlY mewsry-supdY i raei Praumady, ihr ans~..er n
nur JK EMS prondes an mwwrional unnttemem (a forcmR enuntrxy
~n nrck ro thar uchanae-n~e emmmirmenn
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It ts slraightforward to show that (soc SecUOn 4.2) pNO3
(rJt ~̀ nmt b~(rnN t r!)J cxceeds pe'D ~(rd t g~llm t b~
(m t a,J, which of course cxcoeds prsO. The presence of an
outuanding nominal pub!ic dcbt is an opcn invilation lo
wipe it ow with an unanlicipated in0ation tax and a depen-
dcnt ESCB cannot bc uustcd not to take up the invhation,
hence inllation rates under the discretionary owcomes ex-
cad thc rates under the ruks outcome (pND exaeds pNR
end p~o excceds p~R). It then follows that rNO is kss than
Fo which in turn is kss than r~. Also, gNd exooeds g~o,
which in turn cxceeds g;. Hcrra, as far as the trcasurus are
concerned, the prexnce of a dependent ESCB and compe-
tition within the EMU improvu welfare, sincc this rcduces
tax distortions and raixs the kvel of exhausrive public
spending ( as measured by the terms in bl and b~), but as far
as the central bankers are concerned this reduces welfare,
sinct u increaxs inflauon (as measured by the krm in bz).
This ts in a nutshell Ihe cun0icl betwan miniskrs for Onance
and central bankcrs. In a xnx, the cax of an indcpendent
ESCB corresponds to noncoopcralion betwan central
banks end ministen for finance whilst the cax of r depen-
dent ESCB means that the monetary and fiacal authoritia
in any particular country are one and the same entity and
can thus bc assumed to coopcratc. It is casy to show that
onc is morc likely to come out strongly in favour of an
independent ESCB when lhc kvel of average public debt (J)
in Europe is high, when thc priority one attacha to price
stability ( b1) is high, and when the pnority one attaches to
climinaung tax distortions ( bt) is low. Since the Debn
Committce consisted largely of central bankers, it is nut
surprising that they have comc ow in favour of an indepcn-
dent ESCB for EMU.
In fact, the condiuons under which one (avours an indepen-
dcnt ESCB ovcr a couperative EM U with a dependem ESCB
(CD) are uactly lhe same cunditiuns under which a wuntry
wunts to join thc EMS and peg its currency lo lhe Ucutsch-
mark (xc Satiun 4.3.1). Murc rclcvant, pcrhaps, is that one
prekrs an indcpcndent ESCB over a non-eooperative EMU
wnh a dependcm ESCB ( ND) when
(61- btrnz) J exceeds Jbt(2 - N) t blNm2Jm
As the numbcr uf mcmben uf the EMU uxreases, this
cundilion becomcs more likely to hoW (be violated), pro-
videJ that bj uceeds (is less than) btm~ In uther wurds,
when the priority une attaches to pnce slability excecds the
pnunty une atlaches to rcducing Wx distonions and rhe
number uf EMII countries is large, one always favours rn
mdepcndam [SCB over a noncouperauve EMl1 wirh a
dcpcndent ESCB, and vic;e versa.
Ncverthc!css, whcn one cumes uw in favuur of a depcndcnt
ESCB, une shuuW rcalize that macrucwnomtc puhcy cuordi-
natiun within the EMU may well be cuuntcrpruduratve when
one restricts attenuon to discrctiunary outcomu (see
Sation S.I). This is likely to occur when lhe advanlages of
cooperauon in the furm uf lower inllatiun are outweighed
by the disadvantagcs in the fortn of more tax distortiuns
and lower kvels of exhaustivc public spending (srx van der
Plocg (19!igb)). Sur:A a countcrtxampk lo the uxfulnesa of
macrouonomic policy coordinatiun is wsily constructed:
when d- -m, thc CD-outcome yiekls the same welfare as
the I-outcome and, when (b2~6t) (N-3) ~ m~(N-I), the
ND-outcomc yieWs a higher welfare than the !-outcorne and
thus the CD-outcome.~~ Macroaonomic policy coordi-
nation destroys dise:ipline and can lhus be counter-
praductivc!
4-4. Fiscal exteroalitks under EMU
Now consider the EMU, morc or less as envisaged by the
Delors Committu, and ask what scope remains for the
cuordination of budgetary policies in Europe. To be yuite
ckar, individual trcasurks must linance their deficits by
borrowing and rannot benefit from xigniorage rcvenua
(cxcept from thox accruing thruugh real growth), the ESCB
is independent and pursucs a stablc price kvel, all bonds are
assumed to be pcrl'at substitutes, capital markcts arc fully
liberaliud, and thc goods markets of Europc are fully inle-
grated with each other but not with the rest of the worW.
In addttion, assume that Europc as a whuk is a small open
aunomy rclative to the rest of thc world. Three externalities
are brie0y considerul: spcnding by individual treasurics is a
public good Io Europe as a whole, inlcrnational tax wmpe-
titiun, and an externahty arising from the common detcrmi-
nation of the real exchange rote and currcnt account of
Eurupc.
LLI. Narional public sprnrling is u publir good
unJer EMU
In vtcw of the planncd compktion of Ihe internal market
for Europe, it sccros reasonable to assume that countries
carc morc and morc about each uthers' Ievels of public
spending on lhe environment, training of luw-skilkd work-
ers, rexarch and devclopment, foreign aid (e.g. to Eastern
Europe), infrastructure, muxums, ete. Althuugh each mcm-
ber country of the EMU bencfits frum a higher Icvcl of
u SulTcum cunJmom arc J- - anJ N- 2 m N- ) or IbilD~l n
hr ~Mn w1, w tbat, when ibe IurLCr cosra ur t~x collnouo 0onunare
n~c runs anuna rrum luwcr ,nlLrwn, woperanon n couorerproduatiivc
iTK counrer.eaample n based u a reanununwa or ruvernmenr SeW ~o
wcb a..ay ae ro remuvc rbc iuoenuve w kvy ~ aurrrue iorl~~oo io ibe
cooperaiive ouat:ome ~be aains oo real nwney baqoexs ue earrcUy
oifser by nre Warea on pubbc ~uen
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puhlic gnods provided hy other countrics of the EMU, they
do not havc to pay the price in lhe form of higher taxes for
if Abxnce of the coordination of budgeury pnlicics means
Ihat exhauslive public spending is not recogniied as a puhlic
good for Europe as a whole and conxquently its supply wilt
be inadequate. The Iheory of clutrs may xrve as a uxful
guide in deciding nn whcther a subgroup of coumries get
togelher and sperialiie in the production of certain publie
gonds.
A special case needs to he made fnr public investmenl,
bceaux this ix in view o( the developments in Eastern Eur-
ope, the had state of the environment and the demand for
infrastruclure very much needed in Europe. There are two
aspecls of public investment that should be stressed: its
international and its intertcmporal nature. II is clear that,
due to lhc fact that most of puhlic investmcnt is a public
good for Europe as a whole, its supply will be deficienl. lust
as important, howevcr, is the fact 1ha1 public investment
with a market rate of return increases the current levcl of
exhaustive public spending, hut kaves the permanent levcl of
exhaustive public spcnding unaRected. The optimal responx
from the point of view of the theory of puhlic finance is to
leave tax rates alone, but horrow and increax the public
sector deficit now in order to finance the investment outlays
and to reap the Ixnefits Iater oa Unfortunatcly, the Delon
Committee recommends guidelines on puhlic-sector defrcita
wilhout making a reference to puhlic inveslmenl nr to per-
manent Icvels of public spcnding. Such a myopic view on
the public-sector's finances is bnund to harm puhlk invest-
ment in Europe and shouki be avoided at all costs. Much
better is to advocate the'golden ruk' of public finarroe: tax
for permanent increases in exhaustive public spending, but
horrow for temporary increases in current exhaustive publk
spcnding and for (temporary of permanent) incrcascs in
public investment wilh a market rate of return.
1.1.1. Inlrrnarionnl lar cnmpefilinn and mx hormnnizalinn
If factors of production, gnods and capital arc highly mobile
within Europe, it is clcar that individual treasuries do not
want thcir tax rates to diverge too much from their competi-
tors' for otherwix they would lox all their revenues to their
compelitors.w Indced convergence is a major objective, but
it is not dear what one xhould converge to (the lowest, the
highest of the average tax rate?) and whe[hcr one rnnverges
~ In racr, rhis sraremrnr is r.nly nur When IoWer uaea an run capirdired.
Ir one rnuntry M. In.tir raxes, rhen houve prxzs mrry ao up by c.~nly
she same amoum as rhe annwry ~alue o! rhe ux ad.antaFe
to Pareto-efficient levds of Iax rates or not. In fact, one must
take accounl of the possibilily that each memtxr counlry of
the EMU attempts to tx a tax haven and have slightly lower
tax rates than ils competilors. In any cax, treaxuríes will
not want to diverge too much, hecause Mherwise the mobile
parl of lheir labour force will prefer lo migrate to the rest
of the EMV end their consumen will prcfer to huy thcir
products from the rest of the EMU. One of the main con-
cerns of Dutch macroeconomic pnlícy is to hring marginal
income lax ratp and VAT rates down to the Europcan
average or, more specifically, German level. Such actions
should be taken eccount of as well. If one takes account of
thex elTects, international compelition will drive down tax
rates and levels of public spending in Europe helow the
kvets that would prcvail under European coordinalion of
budgelary policies. The downward bias in tax rates arises
from futile, beggar-lhy-neighhour attempts to cut tax rates
and increases when the number of EM U{ountries increaxs.
In general, when an individual trcasury is faced with EMU-
competitors who have s much lower need for revenues (due
lo lower permanent levels of exhauslive puhlic spending), it
is forced to cut tax rates and exhaustive puhlic spending,
a~d to allow privale consumplion to flourish, even thnugh
it is faced with a large need for public revenucs. If EMU-
countries have similar preferences, tax smoothing does not
only occur over time, hut also hetwcen EMUtompetitors,
even though their kvels of puhlic deM and dcsired uhaustivc
public spending difier. The main point is thal lhe outcome
under tsx competition is likely to be inelTicknt, since all
EMU-countries would be beuer oR if they raixd tax rates
and levels of exhaustive puhlic spending.~~
Various studies on tax competition and on tax harmoniza-
tion are now becoming available. One of the main findings
is that the immobile factors of production ( usually thc poorer
workers) are going to be the bstts of uncoordinated tax
competition and most heavily, since the mobile factors of
production (such as capital) will find their way to tax havens
and thus have a high price-elasticity and impox a high
excess burden rclative to the amount of revenues colkctcd
(Sinn (1989)). To a certain extcnt, consumers will gain ax
competition forces down VAT ratec Another xt of results
is that the residence principle leads to an inelTicient world
allocation of saving and that the source principle leads to
an inefTicient world allocation of investment. In addilion, it
can be shown somewhat surprisingly that in a market-clear-
ing world witb perfect capital mobility ( and Ihe interest rate
determined on the world market) the residrnce principle is
optimal and there are no gains from tax coordinalion (Razin
'~ The pninl may 6e rerrkened tome..lur irone allowscounrnestncmmnrre
in rAr Mnviuon nf puhlic aoods le a. an rlricicnr kaal sysrcml
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and Sadka (1989b and c)).~ In addition, onc could arguc
that tax distortions anJ evasion c~n be avoided through,
say, Danng taxcs on nauonalily rathcr than on rcsidcncc,
but (givcn only too common attempu to cvade uxa) by far
thc bcst mcthod seems to be to go for a coordinated ap-
proach to tax hxrmonization ( Sinn (1989j), which is what
thc Delors Committx seems to have in mind. Givcn the
hbcralization and integration of marke4 for capital, goods
and xrviccs, there is more scope for individual European
countrics to imposc advcrx cxtcrnalitiu on othcrs, and thus
thcre is a need for coordination of capital income taxation
within Europe, starting with agreeing oa a ux base and
followed by seuing minimum statutory rates (Tanzi and
Bovcnbcrg (1990)).
4.4.3. furopr's current uccount ir u pubfic good
Sincc the EMU is not a closed aonomy but an open ccon-
omy relatívc to the rest of the world, onc can lhink of a
numbcr of uternalitics to do wilh the facl that all EMU-
cuumnes share a common real exchange ratc and currcnt
account vis-à-vir the ~st of the world (sec Cohcn and
Wyplosz ( 1989)). Budgelary policia of thc various treasurics
now juintly determine Europe's rwl exchange rate and cur-
rcnt account. A budgetary cxp:rnsion by any of thc ueasuriu
of thc EM U raiscs the dcmand for Europcan goods relativc
to thou from the rest of the world, and thus inducts an
appreciation of Europc's real cxchange rate and a dcficit on
Europe's currcnt aceount Absence of the coordination of
budgetary policies in Europe means that Europds ~al ex-
changc rete and current auount are not rcràognized as public
guuds and kads to inefTicient outcnmes whcn budgetary
pohcies under the EMU arc pursued in a compeutive
(ashion
Trcasunes must satisfy thoir usual mlcrtemporal budgel
constramts, but individual EMUcountries do not satisfy
sueh an mtcrtcmporal constramt vis-d-vis the ourside world
direcdy Inslcad, the EMU-countnes face a ~uint intertem-
poral budget constramt vis-ó-ru the counlries outside lhe
EMU Mure prcciscly, when Ihe EMU as a whok is solvent,
Ihe prescnt value of the sueam of the EMU's balance-of-
tradc surpluscs must equrl the outstending nct loreign debt
of thc EMU as a whule The EMU's balance uf lrade is
jwndy detemuncd, smce it currespunds to the owpul pro-
duad by the whuk of thc EMU mmus pnvate and public
cunsumpuun of thc whuk of the EMU. A budgetary upan-
~ lhlur ra.mpka ur rAc u~rerrunun.l w.rJuutwo ur rsa pu4.rn rn rwu-
umry YriKr.l tyurLArmm mu.fela .nA . wea4rvelupcd wpplr rwtc
~n tx ruund m trentcl ~nJ Raon IIYY), IW91. Frenkd.r ol (IVY9).
and K.un ud S.dY~ IIYY9.) An eaampk nf rha Pauro-rmqunnY
eRnu or A.rmumnrwo uf V AT rnn on Ee round m Korn 119Y9)
sion by any of thc EMU-countrics raiscs public or pnvate
consumption and thus induccs a dcfiàt on Europc's curtcnl
account. The associated appreciation of Europ~a rwl cx-
change ratc rcduces the cost of goods imported from the
rest of thc worW, and thus rcduas thc cost of Gving and
boosta rwl incomc for all EMU-citizcns.
When cach treasury attcmpu to usc budgctary policy to
appraiate the ~al exchange rate of Europe and thus raise
the real income of its citirsm, it increases its tax ratc and its
kvel of public consumption. In thc abscnce of European
coordinatioa of budgctary policies, tltc rwl cxchange rate
of Europe is undervalucd whi4st cxhaustivc public spcnding
and ta: ratu are too low relativc to the coopcntivc outcome.
The ruson ia that spending by trcasuries rcduces thc cost
of living for all EMU-citiuns and is thus a public good. In
elTxt, each EMU-country is trying to pau the burden of
apprxiating [hc rcal value of Europè s cutrcncy on to its
EMU-compctitors (van dcr Plocg (1990b)).
Thc EMU as a whok might óavc an cxplicit target value for
its currcnt account, perhaps a deficit becausc Europe wants
capital from outsidc Europc to pour into Europe in ordcr
to rcbuild Eastern Europe. If this is the case, tach of the
EMU-coumrics will try to shift the burdcn of loouning thc
fiscal stance to its EMU-competitors. The result is that
public spending as a whok will be too low throughoul
Europe and capital in(lows inw Eurupc will not bc high
cnough, rclativc to thc outcome where all EMU-countria
coordinate thcir budgetary policies.
So far, this part has assumcd that guidchnes for nauonal
public srxtor deficits are unne~ssary and, perhaps, cven
undesirabk. Howcver, the externalities in this section suggest
thal it may be worth whik to impose a rcyuirement on the
ovcrall borrowing reyuiremem for Europe. Thc poim is thal
if EMUcountries only considcr thcir own currcnt account
and not thc currcnt awount of Europe, then sur:h hmits on
borrowing from outside the Europcan Community may act
as a substitute for European coordinauon of budgetary
policies. Hcnce, il may bc dcsirable to allow individual
governments to borrow whal lhey want from European
households and instiwuons, bw to constrain or to encourage
them in their borrowing from outsidc the European Com-
munily.
S- Counterproductivity of macroeconomic
policy coordination
Most of the dtscussiun so far g)vcs the tmpression that
intcrnational coordinatiun of macruewnomic policies u al-
ways a good Ihing, given the particular exchange-rate regime
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in force. However, there are a variely of situations under
which international coordination worxns the wdfare of
the countries concerned. This section dixusxs three good
reasons why intemational policy ccwrdinatinn may he
counterprnductivr. (i) it worxns the dixipline of central
hanks and lhus kads to higher inllation; ( ii) it may provoke
an adverx responx from Ihird countrin (such as the USA);
and (iii) it can make the countries conttrned worse oR when
there is uncertainty or disagrcement atyout how the global
economy funclions. Since the move towards the EMU
cloxly resemhles international policy coordinalion under a
ftoat, thex are in prirkiple also three good rcasons why the
move towards thc EMU may he undesirabk.
5.1. Caordirutlon deshoys dlsciplhre:
Reles vetaa~ dfstttNion
The view that intemational policy coordination is never a
bad thing is fallacious, becaux it can worsrn the credibility
probkms of the central banks vis-b-vis private sextor agents
and can thereforc be counterproductive. This paradox easily
arixs within the context of a Keynesian multitountry world
with rational eapectations in financial markets and nominal
wagc rigidity (RogoR(1985)).'~ Central banks have an inan-
tive to renege on previously ennounced plans by engaging
in an unanticipated monetary espansion, bocaux lhis kads
to higher prices, eroda the ral values of the wsge and
lhus boosts employment and output. International policy
coordination under e Iloat destroys the dixipline of antral
banks and thus Iwds, in eyuilibrium, to higher inllation and
lower welf~re for all countria conarned. The rcason is
that in the absenoe of coopention, the depreciation of the
exchange nte and associated in0ation costs provide a disin-
antive to renege, which dod nol erix under a cnoperative
Iloat. Another wey of looking at the parados is that coalition
among a sub-xt of playcra, the verinus cenlnl banks, can
worxn the garne with the remaining playen, private sector
agrnb.
This paredos does not only arix in a world plagued by
widesprcad unemploymcnt, bul also occura in a bng-term
world with full empbyrnent and ell markets clearing (vsn
der Ploeg (198gb)).'a The time inconsistency now has a
One vay to o~ercomr the prohkm á rime inconrnnrcy n o11en thoutM
to be to ap{wim umxmnVC ormral Mnken. In a tw.ocounlry worM
thia ia Mrticularly true ror aaymmetne rhoekr. lrol symrnrtrie ah.xka
weakm the oar rrn cornrrvativc untral Mnkm (Laakar 119a9)1-
~ Here aurntinn u focused on a mone~ry markelckarina model; Kehat
(19a7; 1969) mnaiden the eaunteryroductivity of ooordirution ot faul
polión .ithin thc wntnl or a rnl mukHClnrina mcdel wth ur~td
Kcumulation.
puhlic-finance ralionale!' because individual governmenls
may levy a surprix in0alion laz and ux the seignioragc
revenuex to cut distorlinnary tases and incrcase spending on
public goods, both of which incrcax wclfare An incrcax in
taaes or public spending worxns forcign wdfare.b In the
abxnce of cooperation lhis utcrnalily is not internalizcd,
so distortionary tasa will be too high and employmrnt and
privale consumplion will he ton low whilst puhlic spending
will be loo high. However, with international policy cooper-
etion, a dixipline devia is destroycd (as the e:change rate
is unaffected hy a surprix inflation tax) end thus inflation
will be higher and holdings of real mnney balances will tx
lower lhan under a non-cooperetire IloaL Hence, intcr-
national policy eoordination is counlerproduclive when the
adverx effecls of exttssive monetary growth on in0ation
arising from a worxning of monetary dixipline outweigh
thc bencficisl wielfarc elTcets of less Iax distortions and a
more optimal provision of public goods. Annther esample
of the counterproductivity of macroeconomic policy coordi-
nation under the EMU, based on using unanticipated in-
Ilatinn to wipe oul the real value of nominal government
debt, is already discussed at kngth in Section 4 3.2.
The point of the above three esampla is that. when one
rcsvicts attention to thc discretionary rather than to the
rules outcome, international policy coordinalion under a
Iloat can be counlerproductive, becaux il worxns credibility
probkms and thus increases the inamive to hsve an unan-
licipated iocrcex in in0ation.51 However, it is important lo
rcalitt that the EMS, and to a much greater exlent Ihe move
towards the EMU, also destroys the dixipline device that is
prevaknt under e non-cooperative Ooat. Hena, the EMS
and EMU worxn credibility probkms of cenlral hanks vis-
d-ris trade unions and nthv privale sector agrnts and may
lhercfon gradually kad to higher intlatinn ratn throughoul
Europe. The mnve from a floal, towards the EMS snd
eventually lowards the EMU, is only desirable when antral
banks elrcady hsve suRcient eredibility and dixipline in
ordv for Ihe private sector lo hclieve Ihat they will not
succumb lo the temptalion to renege on announced policies.
w Thr limr inoonaialency arian dnpite the hct tMt puhlic and privale
prdtrcrara coincide. A relrted wura ot nme inconsiwmcy w vhrn
there ia a con0ia het.een a Irtasury and a orntrd Mnk vyina nut Io
ruocumb te preasure from miniam and ahrr pMitinana to finana
puhlic apendina .rita aci(tninraac larc Senron t.7).
~ Thn policy chanae Inda w r vade aurylua, vhicA n chokcd ofr hy an
, ti
apprecurion d rhe real eachanae nte. Itenoe, rnaeian amwmpion of
home aonda 61b and roreian velfarc fdla.
Fiorrrer. it ia imponam to rnlia thal Ihere cairl muntcrtaampln lo
1he poinl that inlernational pnlicy coordinatinn on he wunttt.
podunivr
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Thu is a Jiffcrcnt way of saying that the Bundcsbank and
De Nedcrlandschc Bank with thcir esallent rcputation for
low-in0ation pubcics must kap a major say in the opcration
of the EMU and the ESCB, and that the ESCB should be
allowed to conduct an indcpendcnt and aulonomous policy.
Indecd, this is pcrhaps one uf thc main rcasona why countnes
whox central banks are kss disciplined (such as France,
Italy or Ircland) chox to join thc EMS. Mcmbership of the
EMS can provtdc such countncs with a'numinal anchor':
by pcgging thcir currencics to the German mark (and giving
up an independcnt monetary policy) they buy the credibility
of the Bundesbank and obtain a bwer in0ation rate than
thcy would othcrwix obtain (Giavazzi and Pagarw (1988),
Gtavazzi and Giovannini (1986b), (1989a), Collins (1988),
Melitz ( IY88a)). However, h can be argued thal thc reduclion
in inllatiun achieved by the EMS countries ic oot more
sprxtacular than thc ones achicvcd by othcr OECD countnes
and Ihat thc sacrificc rauos o( somc EMS countria are
notably worx lhxn thox oC other OECD countrics (e.g.
Dornbusch (1989)). The move towards the EMU may dilute
thc rcpwation of thc Bundcsbank and thus worxn credibility
problems lhroughout Europe and incrcax in0ation in Eur-
ope; if this is the cax, the move from the EMS towards the
EMU may well be undeairabk from thc point of vicw of lhe
objective o( in(lation. The rax of Ircland, Aowcvcr, suggcsu
that the dramauc drop in inllation u a mised b{essing,
bttaux although it was tuccessful as far aa gaining crafi-
bility is cortcernaf (Krcmcrs (1989)), it has also led to the
problems of high Public debt, massive cmigration and high
uncmploymenl (Dornbusch (1989)).
S-2. TLe EMU versua she ress of tóe worldu
Conslder the EMU versus the rest of the wurW, wy thc
United Statcs of Amcnca. Thcrc u onc curretrcy in the
EMU, the ccu, whox value in terms of US dollars Iloats.
Thcre is a stable US ánd a stabk European moncy supply,
so ancntiun is focuxd on lhc fisul policy responxs to a
situation of stagflation cauxd by a world-wtdc advcrx sup-
ply shock. Under a global, non-cuopcrative outcome, thc
USA e,tploits lhe smalkr stu of the EMU countrics by
havmg a luoxr fixal stance and Ihus appraiating the real
valuc uf thc US dollar vis-á-rir the ccu and esporting in-
Oation to the countrics of the EMU. Howcvcr, when thc
countncs of the EMU cuuperate, thcy un bc trcated as a
bloc of roughly thc same siu as thc USA and the analysts
Is as under a float (see Sectiou 1.21: right-wing (left-wing)
trcasurics have a too luox (tlght) budgctary starrce rclatively
1, tkl.~u ~~ u~ r~„Iw ,v .,~ ,rrr rt„ca ttvavet
to Ihe global, cooperauve outcume. When lhe USA is faced
with a coordinated EM U, it can no longcr employ tbe uctic
of approciating the real value of thc US dollar so that Europe
has highcr inflation when its fiscal policíu are coordinatod.
However, the USA now must have a tighter fiscal stance
and thus unemploymcnt in both the USA and Europc will
be highec h follows that coordination of budgcury pohcies
within the EMU can bc counterproductive, especially when
governments are a lot about unemployment.
The above is again a standard proposition in gamc thcory:
a coalition among a sub-group of players (counlrics of the
EMU) can darcax thc utihtics of thoac players, becaux it
may provoke an advcrx respotuc from othcr playen (the
USA).
5.3. Disagreetroeot oo tbe worltlagy of tbc global ecotaoy
Vanous rxonomists, particularly policy advixra in supn-
national organvations sucó as the IMF, argue that many
countrics are ~luctant to participate in internatiotsal policy
coordination, baaux cithcr thcy arc uncertain on how thc
global xonomy funcuons and unsure about the naturc of
the intcrdcpcndcncks bctwan their economy and otbu
rxonomies, or tt.eir vkw on thcse mattcn dí(fers from the
vicw of their partnccs in the EMS or summit tneetinga. For
csampk, Gcrman o(Ticials havc ban knowo to argue that
a budgctary eapansion is bad for Gcrmao cmpbytncnt,
which is a1 variarrce witó what most economisu teaclt and
havc bttn Iaught and is probably al variance wiló wbat
officials of othcr countries believa Given that whca you ask
10 macroaonomists to givc an answer to a questioo they
are likely to givc 10 diffcrcnt answcrs, theorists must live in
Cloudcuckoo-land when thcy think that macroosonomuts,
kt abne policy-maken, can agree on a common model. It
is thereforc no surpnx that govemment officials disagra
and quibbk about the functioning of the global economy
and thus a jurriuri arc likely to havt the wrong view. Such
lack of knowkdge and disagrecment on the fuactioning of
the world oconomy can casily rendcr international pobcy
coordinauoo countcrproductivc and make all countrks con-
arned worx off (Ghosh (1986), Frankel (1988)). For caam-
pk, using 10 mulutountry models (e.g. Bryant er a!. (1988))
as rcpresenting the views of the US Guvemmcot and othcr
guvcrnments, or the true world ecunumy, out of 1 000 poss-
ible combinations monetary coordination perceptibly im-
proved US welfare in only 546 caxs and welfare of othcr
industriahzed countnes in only 539caxs(Frankcl and Rock-
ett (1988))- Indad, many have argued that this is thc main
bamer lo suocessful international policy coordiaation. A
kss knuwn result is that whcn countnu have the wrong
vicw on the rraturc of global intcrdcpendencc and do no[
couperale, they can be much beuer olT than whea tbey havc
IS7
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the cnrrect view on the nature of global inlerdcpendence and
do cooperata Ilence, hetter information need not make
countries txtter o1T whrn countries do not eooperate because
this can worsen various forms of cnnflicts arising from
inlernational externalities (van der Plocg (19R9d)).
6. Conclusions
The main benefils of lhe EMU are wdl known and nol
directly rclated to the issues of macroeconomic pnlicy coordi-
netion: (i) eliminetion of ezchange-rate unartainty end the
costs of hedging against such risks; (ii) morc eeonomic ux
nf international reserves for Europe as e wholr, (iii) avail-
ability of a more efTicient unit of account, medium of ex-
change and store of value, and the ecu is likely to become a
'vchicle cmrency'; (iv) saving on transaction and infotTnation
cosls; (v) less speculative ttows of capital; (vi) political am-
bitioro of an integrated Europe are achicved; and (vii) more
power in G-3 summit meetings, particularly in mattera of
monetary policy.s! The main costs are the loss of an indepen-
dent monetary policy, possibly a weakening of monetary
discipline, and a sub-optimal govttnment rcvenue mix in Ihe
scnse of too low (high) in(lation rates and too high (low)
tax ratea for thnse countrin with high (bw) costs of tu
collxtion. Sintt most of the t-nefits show non-rivalry in
consumption snd are'public goods' whilst the disadvantages
are morc líke 'private goodá , the cakulus of participation
suggest that Europe may not move far cnough in the direc-
tion of the EMU and xmall countries are likely to be 'free
riders' in the elTorts to move towerds the EMU (Hamada
(1985), Chapter 3). Hence, the impetus of the EMU must
cnme from the larger countries of thc European Community.
Mrnt of Ihis report is, however, conarrred wilh the potential
necd of macroeconomic polky coordination during the vari-
ous phases of economic and monetary integration in Europe.
Taking the probkms of aubilizalinn policy in the faa ot
Europcan-wide stagllalion aused by a common adverse
supply-shock under alternative exchange-rete regime first,
one finds that the EMU performs better than the EMS or a
rcgirne of floating exchange rates. The reason ia that the
futik compctitive attempu to appreciate the currency and
export inflation snd the ascociated ' beggar-lhy-neighbour'
tightening of monctary policy arc altogether impossibk
within Ihe EMU. EMS-foltowers manage to disinflale away
Oriptul mntrilwtioro to the theory of optimum cvrtcrc7 ~ros ~rr
Mundell (1961), McKinnon (196Jt ~nd Kenen (I9fr9) ~hich. rnpecy-
i.ely, rmph~sia thc crileria nf fMw mnbiny, oPennqs, and diversif-
uuon and fisnl inteprtinn Surveyr of the pros ~nd enns nf common
carrenc7 ue~s ~rt pren by Ish~y~ma (IV75) and hy v~n der Mnea
119a0q ~nd othrn in wRR I IOx9)
an edverse supply-shock hy apprcciating their currrncy rl.r-
d-ri.r the German mark at the ezpense of welfare in Germany,
but would not !x able to do this under the EMU. In fact,
this is one of lhe kw reasonz why Germany may he kccn to
move to Ihe EMU. As far as budgetary policy responses to
European-wide stagflation are conttrrred, German ho
gemony in monetary policy under the EMS implies that
Germany has e tighter fiscal stantt Ihan the nther EMS-
counlria snd rhus Germany is unlikely to fulfil its role as
'locnmotive engine of growth for Europe'. flolh the Eh1S
and the EMU ere likely, especially as inlra-Eurnpcan trade
increases, to have e built-in deflalionary bias in stabilizalion
policies, unless budgetary pnlicies are coordinated. When
real wage rigidity and Mher fnrms nf indexation arc im-
portant phenomena, the particular uchange-rate regime in
fora is irrdevant for real outcnmes and absencr nf imer-
national policy coordination is likely to lead to too tight
budgetary pnlicies as wcll.
However, when Europe is hit by country-specific shocks or
shocks associatcd with switches in preferences, the EMU
scores very badly on stahilization policy. The rcautn is, of
course, that the currency cannot under the EMU appreciate
in responx to the excess demand. The EMU is therefore
only likely lo respond well to country-sprrific or switch
shocks when either Iabour markets clcar instantaneously (as
in such a fanciful workl stabilixation policy is not needed),
or labour mobility throughout Europe is high To lhe extent
lhat this is not likely, a strong case can be made for a
European federal transkr scheme which Vans(ers inrnme
from regions with overcmployment to regions with unem-
ployment and whieh should thus be budget-neutral on the
Community level. Clurly, there arc inantive probkms with
such e transfer scheme but they arc ressonably well resolved
on a nationel kvel and there is no reason to believe thcy
unnot he resotved at s Europcan kvel. Only giving benefils
whcn the unemployed have the duty to teke a job if oRered,
cven if it is not in their field of training, end training
programmcs wouki help. If the people of Europe are not
willing to inttoduce an EFTS, individual countries have a
duty to pay much more sttrntion to structural supply-sidc
policies in order to ensure Ihat national labour markets
adjust morc quickly to full cmployment.
Moving on to Ihe puhlic-finana aspats of moving from the
EMS to the EMU, it is clear that s monetary union without
sn independent central bank leads, in the absena of coordi-
nation of the policia of the various fixal and monetary
authorities, lo excessive inflation, too low tax rates and too
high levels of public spending. The reason is that each
treasury fails to inlernaliu the adverse efïects of grabbing
more seigniorage from the common central bank on lhe
inflation rate that is common tn all countrics of the union.
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W hen crnlrul bankcn and mmistcn for linanc;c can bc relied
upon not to suceumb to lhc lemplatíon lo kvy surpnx
inllation laxes, there is not much of awx for an indcpendent
ESCB. Nowevcr, if onc really wants to be sure that thc
monetary authoriucs arc not going to give in to lhc dcmands
of unions for highcr wages or of ministers for finance for
financing thcir dcficus arising from high kvels of public
spcnding, thc bcst stratcgy seems to Ae to appoint conxrva-
tive central bankcrs to the board of thc ESCB and to makc
surc that thc status of thc ESCB is awonornous and indepcn-
dcnt o( pohtical pressurcs. The pria unc pays for insli-
tutionahung monctary discipline is a sub-opumal publíc
rcvcnue mix,inllauon and thus xigniorage rcvenuts ócing
tuo low whilst tax rales are too high and lhe level of cxhaus-
uvc pubhc spcnding loo luw. Evcn though the inllatiun
tax might disappcar, some xigniorage revcaues wdl accrue
thruugh rcal growth, and it will be a major poliucal issue to
Jecide how lhox will bc distributcd to lhc mcmbcrs of lhe
EMU.
It is ckar thal the Delors Committee has come out strongly
ín favour of an indcpcndcnt ESCB baxd on the German
model, but it is also clear that this implies a thrwt for the
siu of the public sator. Devdopmenls in Fastern Europe
may lead to exceu demand for German guods and an in-
crcax in Gcrman inflation and thus in European inllauon.
TogNher with lhe dilulion of thc German monetary disci-
phne, cauxJ by the appointmcnt of leu dixiplincd central
bankers to the Council uf the ESCB, thts carries the seeds
of a Irss successful EMU (rom the inllation point of vrew.
Therc are at least lhree fiscal externahues whtch also pox a
Janger tu thc siu of thc pubbc sator in Europe, unlcss,
of courx, budgaary pubcies of the various lrwsuries are
cuurJinated The fint is thal, as Eurupe becuma more and
more mtegrated, spenJing by nadonal treasuries on items
such as rhe cnvrronmcnt, traming, resurch and devclop-
mem, furcign aid (e g to Eastern Europe), and infrastruc-
turc, bccomcs murc and more Itkc a public good to all
cinuns o( Europe, whox supply will bc inadeyuate unleu
thc treasuries cuurdmate their pulicia. The saond is that
internaUUnal compctition bcrwecn the trwsunes of Europe
dnvrs tax ratcs Jown anJ leaves less room for exhauslivc
pubhc spending. The thtrd is Ihat Ircasuries may wish to
luusen thcrr fiscal stance m order to appraialc the real
exchenge rate uf Eurupe anJ buost the ~al income of their
ouzens Smce such a pohcy alsu has beneficul e(fects un the
rrst of the EMU-cuuntnes, public spending wdl be too low
unkss coopcration takes plaax. Thero does not sam to be a
fum public-financc cax for imposing uppcr limils on public
sector deficits, as the Delors Committct recommends, bul
in vicw of this last cxtcmality it may bc xnsibk to impox
limits on borrowing by Ireasurics from outside the European
Community for otherwix Ihcrc may be inwllicknl coatrol
over the valuc of Europc's currency in in[ernational rnarkets.
Onc un think of three reawns why macroxonomic policy
coordination within Europe can be counterproductiva.
Fintly, it may provoke an edverx raponx from the USA
kading to higher unemploymcnt in Europe. Secondly, it may
dcstroy the ux of the ucbangc rate as a discipline devicc
for ccntral banks. Thirdly, conflicting vicws on how the
global oconomy functions may ~ndcr rnacroeconomic policy
coordination counterproductive. The first can bc countcred
by encouraging macroeconomic policy coordination betweeo
Europc and the USA whicó seems more likcly as an inte-
grated Europe is likely to bxome a morc powcrful negotialor
in thc G-3 summits. The xcond can be countered by ensuring
that this ESCB has an indcpendcnt and autonomous statrrs
and that the sok task of the ESCB is to prexrve pricc
stability. The third can bc countered by more discussions
involving politiciana, aonomists and the public. Given that
all thra points against macroewnomic policy coordination
can be countered, il shuuld be no surprix lhst this repon
comludrx with a strong pka for the cuordination of budget-
ary policics in Europe m orJer tc ensurc thal stabliz,tion
policy is uxd e(Tectively tu fight widesprud unemploymcnl
and, more generally, to sakguard lhe sizc of thc public sa[or
in Eurupe.
One can kgiumately wonder whcthcr thc currcnt siu uf the
public sector m Eurupe is tuu largc rclative to the firsPbest
outcome. Indttd, many pcupk beheve this is the casc so
that Europc u now in a saond-bcst or thirJ-bcst suuauon.
Introducing distortiuns m a seconJ-bcst world may be desir-
abk, if lhis cancels the ef(ect uf olher drslorlions. Nowcvcr,
thc expericnce of the USA suggcsts that the EMU may well
puse a thrcat to thc size of the public sutor. In the long run,
when the EMU is firmly cstablishtd, Europe may have to
gct used to the prublcm of cuping with a too small ziu of
Ihe pubbc xctor. In the medium run, the competilivc xtUng
o( budgcury pohcics undcr the EMU may speed up thc
prucess of cutting thc siu of lhe pubhc xctor and laking
Europc mtu Ihe dtrectiun of the first-best optimum Peopk
who bcheve that tht currcnt ute ul the public stttor in
Europe is too large shuuld hke this.
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